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ABSTRACT
When Finance Meets Trade: Three Essays in International Economics
by
Chenyue Hu
This dissertation examines international capital mobility, focusing on equity and debt
markets. I not only study the determinants and patterns observed in capital markets,
but also investigate how capital flows affect and are affected by trade. The first chapter
“Productivity matters: a new angle on equity home bias” examines the effect of countries’
industrial structure on global portfolio diversification. Results indicate that sectoral home
bias is stronger in unproductive sectors where investors face fewer risks than in productive
sectors. Furthermore, national home bias is stronger in the countries with diversified
industrial structures because intra-national risk hedging across industries replaces the
need for inter-national risk hedging across countries. In the second chapter “Optimal trade
policies after sovereign defaults,” my coauthor and I offer new theoretical and empirical
insights into the effect of sovereign defaults on trade. Empirical evidence from the changes
in trade shares after debt renegotiations as well as Aid-for-trade statistics indicates that
sovereign debt renegotiation is not associated with trade sanctions. Using a two-country
DSGE model with incomplete financial markets, we are able to explain why trade sanctions
are not observed. Our model departs from the existing literature on sovereign defaults by
building on the strategic interaction between debtors and creditors. We solve the model
viii
numerically to determine the optimal trade costs given different combinations of debt
and income levels. The third chapter “Does debt structure matter? Financial constraints
and trade revisited” examines the implications of firms’ heterogeneous debt structure
for international trade. Small firms rely heavily on bank loans while big firms have
access to corporate bonds. I model this as a nonlinear financial constraint which places
disproportional burden on small firms which further limits their production and ability
to export. An empirical analysis based on the model complements previous work in
examining the degree to which financial constraints impede trade.
ix
CHAPTER I
Sectoral Productivity Matters: A New Angle on
Equity Home Bias
This chapter theoretically and empirically examines how industrial structure impacts
equity home bias at both industry and country levels. I build a two-country two-sector
model to examine how the differences in sectoral productivity affect a country’s risk ex-
posure and hence influence its investors’ portfolio choice. First, the model contends that
investors show stronger home bias in unproductive sectors than in productive sectors
where they face more risks. Using a unique dataset on equity holdings, I calculate the
industry level home bias of 26 sectors in 43 countries and empirically confirm the model’s
prediction. A second model prediction is that investors avoid highly-specialized countries
as a consequence of their risk-hedging motives. I confirm the prediction in the data by
finding that national home bias is negatively correlated with a country’s degree of indus-
trial specialization. Third, the model uncovers the relationship between investors’ sectoral
choice and country bias which sheds light on the interaction between intra-national risk
hedging across sectors and inter-national risk hedging across countries. Fourth, the chap-
ter provides an explanation for the increase in developing countries’ foreign investment;
the expansion of emerging markets’ tradable sectors increases domestic risks, which induce
investors in these countries to aggressively hold foreign assets. I calibrate the model to
the Chinese trade data and successfully replicate the trend of China’s historical holdings
of US equities.
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1.1 Introduction
International finance models typically show that investors can reap substantial bene-
fits from international portfolio diversification. Yet the data indicate that domestic equity
accounts for a predominant share of investors’ portfolios, despite the current integration
of the world capital market. The phenomenon of ‘equity home bias’, documented by
French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995), continues to be a puzzle in
international economics.
Various attempts have been made to explain home bias by analyzing investors’ risk-
hedging motives, but most papers abstract from industrial structure and as a consequence
ignore within- and across-industry productivity differences across countries. In this chap-
ter, I contend that sectoral productivity differences matter significantly for investors’
risk-hedging pattern and portfolio choice. I identify and explain two novel facts about
home bias by adding the sectoral dimension to the current literature. First, I show that
sectoral home bias is stronger in unproductive sectors where investors face fewer risks
than in productive sectors. Second, I find that national home bias is stronger in the
countries with diversified industrial structures because intra-national risk hedging across
industries replaces the need for inter-national risk hedging across countries.
A large body of literature has focused on home bias at the national level, but little
is known at the industry level about investors’ preference between domestic and foreign
assets. Using a unique dataset on institutional investors’ equity holdings complemented
by information on sectoral stock market values, I compute the sectoral home bias of 26
industries from 43 countries. Furthermore, I empirically find that sectoral home bias is
negatively correlated with sectoral productivity.
My explanation for the variation in sectoral home bias is as follows. International
investors hold financial assets to hedge against two specific kinds of risks: labor income
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risk and real exchange rate risk. Productivity differences affect both a sector’s labor force
and its trade pattern. As a consequence, industries have distinct exposure to these two
kinds of risks. A sector with greater productivity is exposed to more risks because the
country’s labor income and real exchange rate are more correlated with the returns to
that sector than the returns to an unproductive sector. Therefore, investors hold fewer
home assets in productive sectors and hence show weaker sectoral home bias.
In order to better understand what drives the difference in sectoral home bias, I build
a model in a two-country two-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) set-
ting. The model embeds Eaton and Kortum (2002)’s framework to capture the effect
of productivity on sectoral size and trade. In order to derive analytical solutions to the
portfolio choice problem in a baseline case with symmetric countries and complete mar-
kets, I follow the approach in Coeurdacier (2009) by analyzing the correlations of returns
from different assets around the steady state of the economy. I also extend the model
by incorporating nontradable sectors. In deriving static and dynamic equity holdings
in extended models, I follow the method of Devereux and Sutherland (2007, 2011), who
employ a higher degree of approximation of an investors’ objective function to capture
lower-order portfolio behavior.
The solution to the model also enriches our understanding of national home bias.
In this multi-sectoral setting, investors are able to risk-hedge not only by holding assets
in different countries (inter-country risk-hedging) but also by holding domestic assets in
different sectors (intra-country risk-hedging). If the covariance across domestic assets en-
sures efficient risk- hedging, there is less need for investors to hold foreign equities. Thus,
there is an interesting interaction between the choice over sectors and the choice over
countries.
The interaction predicts that industrial specialization has a negative effect on national
home bias. More diversified countries exhibit higher degrees of intra-national risk hedging
such that sectoral shocks in an individual industry do not affect the whole economy in a
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substantial way. In contrast, highly-specialized countries incur greater risks due to their
few productive sectors. There is limited intra-national risk hedging since other domestic
sectors are susceptible to the loss of returns once the key industries are in peril. Conse-
quently, national home bias in those countries is low as their investors hold fewer domestic
assets and rely more heavily on international risk hedging by holding foreign assets.
To account for intra- versus inter-national risk hedging patterns, I empirically test
the relationship between national home bias in equity holdings and countries’ industrial
specialization index proxied by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). I find a negative
correlation which supports the prediction of the model: More specialized countries have
lower national home bias.
In the final section of the chapter, I elaborate on one model application that it offer-
s an explanation for developing countries’ aggressive investment in developed countries’
assets, despite the fact that developing countries provide higher returns to capital. The
results of my model suggest that developing countries’ heavy reliance on trade together
with their concentration of production in tradable sectors induces their investors to invest
abroad to hedge against domestic risks. This can explain why we observe the surge in
South-to-North capital flows in recent decades. I calibrate my model to the Chinese data
and successfully replicate the country’s trend of US equity holdings by targeting the trade
data.
This chapter extends the literature that studies investors’ risk-hedging motives as a
reason for equity home bias by adding the sectoral productivity dimension. Coeurdacier
and Rey (2013) provide a comprehensive survey of this strand of literature. Other exam-
ples include Baxter and Jermann (1997) and Heathcote and Perri (2013) which focus on
the hedging of labor income risk with different assumptions regarding the covariance be-
tween physical capital and human capital. Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Coeurdacier (2009)
and Kollmann (2006) introduce real exchange rate risk by including one tradable good
from each country. Compared to previous work, my model allows for multiple sectors of
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production within countries and intra-sectoral trade across countries. Investors not only
choose assets based on the country of issue but also the sector, and thus have more ways
to hedge against the two risks. My model is also a more general case of Tesar (1993),
Matsumoto (2007) and Collard et al. (2007) who have one tradable and one nontrad-
able sector in each country. I introduce sector-specific trade costs in Eaton and Kortum
(2002)’s framework to capture the nontradability of some industries.
The chapter is also related to the literature on the interaction of risk sharing and in-
dustrial specialization. The strand of literature can be traced back to Helpman and Razin
(1978) who argue that the benefits of specialization can be achieved by trade in assets to
insure against production risk. Recently, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) and Koren (2003)
find empirical support for the positive impact of financial integration on trade specializa-
tion. This chapter focuses on the feedback of industrial structure on asset positions by
examining how trade specialization affects portfolio diversification.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical
findings about sectoral and national home bias. Section 3 describes and solves the model.
Section 4 elaborates on the application of the model. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I empirically examine two hypotheses about equity home bias. First,
at the sectoral level, investors exhibit stronger home bias in less productive sectors than
in more productive sectors. Second, at the national level, counties with a higher degree
of industrial specialization show weaker aggregate home bias. The analysis will support
the model prediction that sectoral productivity differences affect portfolio choices between
domestic and foreign assets.
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1.2.1 Data Description
Equity Holdings
Factset/Lionshare provides comprehensive data on the equity holdings of institutional
investors from over 100 countries or regions since 1998. Typical institutional investors in-
clude banks, insurance companies, retirement or pension funds, hedge funds and sovereign
wealth funds. Table A.1 lists the top twenty U.S. institutional investors by assets as of
2014Q3.
Institutional investors have played an increasing role in equity markets worldwide.
Figure A.1 shows how the US household share of equity ownership has fallen over time.
Robert Shiller calls this phenomenon ‘migration of capital from Main Street to Wall
Street’. The dominance of institutional investors over household investors is also com-
monly observed in other countries.1
Factset/Lionshare data originate from public filings by investors (such as 13-F filings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S.), regulatory agencies around
the world and company annual reports. Using the dataset, we can group securities by
their location and sector, as well as group holders by their nationality.2
Figure 1.2.1 shows the funds allocation for the US on Jan 5, 2015. The U.S. invests
83.1% of its equities domestically.3 The U.S. is highly diversified in terms of sectors, with
finance, health and electronics being the most popular ones.
Stock Market Values
Thomson Reuters Datastream offers global country- and sector-level financial data
including market values. Factset/Lionshare and Datastream unfortunately do not cate-
1According to INSEAD OEE Data Services, households only accounted for 12% ownership of the EU
corporate equities in 2012.
2Data limitations only allow me to aggregate the top 50 institutional investors in each of the 100+
countries. Since the top institutional are the most comprehensive and unbiased investors (like those listed
in Table A.1), their portfolio choices are representative of the national equity preference to a great extent.
3It is partly due to the gigantic size of its stock market relative to other markets. The US accounts
for around 40% of the world market portfolio.
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Figure 1.1: US Institutional Investors’ Country and Sector Allocation
Note: This figure shows the US institutional investors’ equity portfolio on Jan 5, 2015. The
source is the ownership data from Factset/Lionshare. The left chart is the allocation across
countries, and the right chart is the allocation across sectors.
gorize industries in the same way. Table A.1 lists the concordance of the two classification
system.
Productivity Measures
I use the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database to calculate sectoral productivity. It
reports data at the 4-digit level of ISIC Rev.4 on value-added, employment, wages and
fixed capital formation by sector. I consider two measures of productivity: labor produc-
tivity and total factor productivity. The former is more comprehensive since investment
data are scarce for developing countries. I divide value-added of a sector by its employ-
ment to get sectoral labor productivity.
I calculate sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) using the method documented by
Inklaar and Timmer (2013)) when they construct the Penn World Table. Capital stocks
are estimated using the perpetual inventory method (PIM) based on Kt+1 = (1−δ)Kt+It,
where Kt is capital stock and It is investment or fixed capital formation. δ represents
capital depreciation which is assumed to be 10% annually. To apply PIM, I need to
compute the initial capital stock K0 of a sector. Inklaar and Timmer (2013) argue that
assuming an initial capital/output ratio k in K0 = Y0 × k leads to superior results. I
compute the value of k by dividing the country’s capital stock by its GDP (both of the
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initial period) in the Penn World Table. Initial capital stock K0 will be the product
of initial net output V0 and k. After computing K0, I use Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It to
trace the dynamic capital stock Kt. I also calculate the sectoral factor intensity 1 − α
by averaging the share of wages in value-added of a sector over time. Given all this in-
formation, sectoral total factor productivity is computed as TFPt =
Yt
Kαt L
1−α
t
. Estimates
are averaged across time between 1998 and 2014 to be used in the cross-sectoral regression.
1.2.2 Sectoral Home Bias
Following Ahearne et al. (2004) and Coeurdacier and Rey (2013), I use the difference
between the actual country-level holdings of equities and the share of market capitalization
in the global equity market to measure national home bias. Home bias in country i sector
s is equal to
HBi,s = 1− Share of Sector s Foreign Equities in Country i Equity Holdings
Share of Sector s Foreign Equities the World Market Portfolio
HBi,s = 1 indicates that country i is fully home biased in sector s since it does not
hold any foreign equities. HBi,s = 0 indicates that country i is fully diversified across
countries. In theory, HBi,s can take any value below 1 (including negative values). The
numerator in the expression for HBi,s uses the data from Factset/Lionshare directly, while
the denominator uses market values from Datastream to get a country’s equity share in
industry s.
The comprehensive sectoral home bias indices are shown in Table A4, complemented
by an abbreviation list of countries and sectors (Table A.1).4 Figure 1.2.2 shows the
histogram of sectoral home bias. The index ranges from -.2 to 1, with many observations
4I exclude the countries whose institutional investors hold only domestic assets. Their investment
pattern is driven by factors other than risk-hedging motives. These countries include Columbia, Cyprus,
Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Peru, Oman and Turkey. Most of these countries’
governments impose strict capital controls on foreign portfolio investment.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Sectoral Home Bias
Note: This chart displays the histogram of the sectoral home
bias index. The formula of the index isHBi,s=1-Share of Sector
s Foreign Equities in Country i Equity Holdings/Share of sector
s Foreign Equities the World Market Portfolio. The data are
from Factset/Lionshare and Datastream. The index covers 26
sectors from 43 countries. There are 834 observations in total,
with mean 0.39 and std. dev. 0.36. Detailed information is
provided in Table A4.
clustered around 0 and 1. Figure 1.2.2 plots US sectoral home bias. Furnishings, apparel
and utilities show the strongest home bias, while publishing, automobiles and telecom-
munications show the weakest.
Using the data on sectoral home bias, I explore the the impact of productivity on
sectoral home bias. As productive sectors hire more labor , the returns to productive
sectors should be more correlated with domestic labor income than is the case for the
returns to unproductive sectors. Hence, productive sectors are exposed to greater labor
income risk. Consequently, investors respond by showing weaker home bias in productive
sectors. In this spirit, I test whether the correlations between sectoral productivity and
sectoral home bias are negative by running the following regression
HBi,s = α0 + α1Xi,s + Z + i,s
9
Figure 1.3: Ranking of U.S. Sectoral Home Bias
Note: This chart lists the US sectoral home bias from highest
to lowest. The horizontal axis labels the home bias index.
The dependent variable HBi,s is sectoral home bias of country i sector s. The inde-
pendent variable is sectoral productivity Xi,s. Besides, Z denotes various configurations
of fixed effects including country fixed effects (denoted Zi) and sector fixed effects (de-
noted Zs). Country fixed effects enable us to evaluate the role of relative productivity
instead of absolute productivity, since in this case country level productivity is controlled
for and we can focus on the within-country variation in sectoral productivity. On the
other hand, sector fixed effects capture many industry-specific characteristics including
factor intensity and nontradability.
The regression results are summarized in Table C. Overall, sectoral home bias is signif-
icantly negatively correlated with sectoral productivity. The results are robust to various
specifications of fixed effects. In the OLS case, when labor productivity increases by 1
standard deviation, sectoral home bias decreases by .303 standard deviation; When TFP
increases by 1 standard deviation, sectoral home bias decreases by .208 standard devia-
tion. The negative correlation between sectoral home bias and sectoral productivity is
robust when the standard errors are clustered at country and sector levels (see Appendix
A.2.1 for more information). Hence, the empirical analysis on sectoral home bias con-
10
Table 1.1: Sectoral Home Bias and Sectoral Productivity
Dep. Var: Sectoral HB ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
labor productivity -0.113 *** -.113 *** -0.112 ***
( 0.0167 ) ( 0.0167 ) ( 0.0167 )
[-0.303 ] [-0.304] [-0.302 ]
constant 1.626 *** 1.621 *** 1.612 ***
( 0.185 ) ( 0.186 ) ( 0.189 )
Country FE No Yes No
Sector FE No No Yes
Observations 454 454 454
Adj R2 0.0899 0.088 0.0882
Dep. Var: Sectoral HB ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
TFP -0.038 *** -0.037 *** -0.045 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
[ -0.208] [ -0.207] [-0.247]
constant 0.472 *** 0.405 *** 0.438 ***
( 0.048 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.050 )
Country FE No Yes No
Sector FE No No Yes
Observations 350 350 350
Adj R2 0.0431 0.0550 0.0562
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and standardized coefficients in brackets.***significant at
1%. The dependent variable is sectoral home bias. The independent variables are productivity in natural
logs. The table reports coefficients in the ordinary least squares (OLS), country fixed effect, sector fixed
effect and country-sector fixed effect models.
firms the hypothesis that home bias is weaker in productive sectors than in unproductive
sectors.
In addition to the baseline specification, I do robustness checks by including interme-
diate imports and outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) as independent variables (see
Appendix A.2.2 for more information). This exercise is to address the concern that trade
patterns can also potentially influence equity home bias: given the integration of world
production, investors may choose to invest abroad because production takes place in other
countries. Table A.2.2 shows that the negative correlation between sectoral productivity
and sectoral home bias still holds when we control for intermediate imports and outbound
FDI. Meanwhile, these two new variables do not show significant association with home
bias.
Based on the variation in sectoral home bias, I further hypothesize that productivi-
ty differences across sectors within a country affect a country’s overall risk exposure and
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hence influences its national home bias. I explore this relationship further in the following
section.
1.2.3 National Home Bias
Using the same dataset and method, I calculate home bias at the national level by
adding up equities by country
HBi = 1− Share of Foreign Equities in Country i Equity Holdings
Share of Foreign Equities the World Market Portfolio
Figure 1.2.3 and Table A.1 show this constructed national home bias index.5 Ire-
land, Luxembourg, Singapore, Belgium and the Netherlands are among the countries
that show the weakest home bias. They share some common features like being smal-
l open economies. Romania, Malaysia, Korea and China show the greatest home bias.
This can be due either to their stringent capital control regime or to their hedging mo-
tives. I will explore the latter in the theoretical part of the chapter.
The home bias index allows me to empirically test my hypothesis that national level
home bias is negatively correlated with countries’ degree of industrial specialization. The
reasoning behind the hypothesis is that, to shield themselves from the excessive risks asso-
ciated with the productive sectors, investors either hold domestic assets in unproductive
sectors or foreign assets. The former is intra-national risk-hedging across sectors and the
latter is inter-national risk-hedging across countries. However, when productive sectors
account for a predominant share in a country, intra-national risk-hedging is limited: if the
key industries fail, the whole economy plummets and the domestic unproductive assets
are not immune to the loss of returns. Hence, investors should avoid holding home assets
in such a concentrated economy, which leads to low national home bias. Based on this
reasoning, I hypothesize that national home bias is stronger in countries with diversified
5 My national home bias index is the most comprehensive so far by covering the most countries,
meanwhile it is consistent with those in existing literature (shown in Figure A.1).
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Figure 1.4: Ranking of National Home Bias
Note: This chart displays the national home bias index. The
formula of the index is HBi=1-Share of Foreign Equities in
Country i Equity Holdings/Share of Foreign Equities the World
Market Portfolio. The data are from Factset/Lionshare and
Datastream.
industrial structure than in countries with specialized structure.
I use the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) to measure industrial specialization. HHI
in country i is defined as the sum of squared shares of each sector (s) in the country’s
total output.
HHIi =
S∑
s=1
b2i,s
The higher the index value, the more concentrated is the country’s production. I use
the three-digit ISIC Rev.4 sectoral data from UNIDO averaged from 1998 to calculate
countries’ HHI. The regression results are summarized in Table 2.2.
In column 1 of Table 2.2, when a country’s HHI increases by 1 standard deviation,
its national home bias decreases by .37 standard deviation. In column 2 where I add the
size of the economy (proxied with GDP) as another control variable, the result is similar.
The coefficients of HHI are negative at 1% level of significance.
In column 3 of Table 2.2, I add a dummy for OECD countries to control for the fact
that the institutional features of financial markets are different between developing and
developed countries. The coefficient of the OECD dummy turns out to be significantly
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Table 1.2: National Home Bias and Countries’ Industrial Specialization
Dep. Var: National HB (1) (2) (3) (4)
HHI -5.900 *** -5.682 *** -6.278*** -5.002 **
(1.645) (1.843) (2.210) (2.364)
[-0.37] [-0.35] [-0.39] [-0.31]
log(GDP) 0.003 0.012 0.006
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036)
OECD dummy -0.211 **
(0.090)
tax haven dummy -0.087
(0.166)
constant 0.704*** 0.622 0.552 0.524
(0.069) (0.976) (0.920) (0.991)
# observations 40 40 40 40
R2 0.1364 0.1247 0.2172 0.1349
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and standardized coefficients in brack-
ets. **significant at 5%,***significant at 1%. The dependent variable is national
home bias. The independent variables include Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
and GDP in natural logs. In addition, OECD dummy equals one if a country is a
member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Tax haven dummy takes the value of one for countries with zero percent capital
gains tax rates.
Figure 1.5: National Home Bias and Industrial Specialization
Note: This figure plots the relationship between national home bias and countries’
specialization index. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is on the horizontal axis
and national home bias is on the vertical axis.
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negative at 5%, indicating that OECD countries show weaker national home bias. After
controlling for this dummy, the coefficient of HHI increases in the absolute value, which
indicates that specialization is more important in explaining the variation in national
home bias.
In column 4 of Table 2.2, I add a dummy for tax havens to correct for potential bias
arising from Factset’s data limitation that institutional investors in some countries may
not only represent the citizens of their own countries, which is especially the case for tax
havens which attract many foreign households. I set the dummy equal to one for countries
with no capital gains tax. The coefficient of HHI is still negative at 5% level of significance
in this case.
Figure 1.2.3 plots country i’s national home bias Hi against the industrial specializa-
tion index (HHIi). Countries like Qatar and Norway, which are heavily dependent on
their oil industry as the main source of income, have high HHIi. As a consequence of
their dependence on the oil sector, other sectors in the two countries cannot buffer the
economy when there are significant fluctuations in the oil industry. Thus, the investors in
the two countries would rather hold foreign assets and exhibit weak national home bias.
In contrast, the U.S. and China have highly diversified industrial structures, so they can
enjoy a relatively high level of intra-country inter-industry risk hedging. As a result, home
bias in these two economies is relatively high.
To sum up the section, I compute sectoral home bias and find its negative correlation
with productivity. I also find that national home bias decreases in countries’ degree of in-
dustrial specialization. In the next section, I build a model to account for these empirical
findings.
1.3 Model
I set up a model in which I derive countries’ optimal portfolio in a two-country two-
sector framework. The solution sheds light on the risk-hedging patterns across sectors
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and across countries. The model also explains the empirical findings about sectoral and
national home bias in the previous section and elicits implications in the next section
about world financial flows.
1.3.1 Setup
1.3.1.1 Producers
Two countries (i = {H,F}) both produce two types of consumption goods (s = {a, b}).
In every country-sector-pair-specific industry (denoted as fi,s), there is a continuum of
varieties z ∈ [0, 1]. The composite good in an industry is a CES aggregate of different
varieties with elasticity of substitution :
Yi,s = [
1∫
0
yi,s(z)
−1
 dz]

−1
A firm in country i sector s producing variety z draws its technology Ai,s(z) from the
Frechet Distribution, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002):
Fi,s(A) = exp(−Ti,sA−θ)
Ti,s captures the central tendency of sector s in country i: the higher the Ti,s, the
higher average productivity of the industry. Meanwhile, θ reflects the dispersion of the
industry; it takes on a great value when the sectoral variance is low. Over time, Ti,s follows
an AR(1) process with autoregressive coefficients ρi,s and i.i.d. shocks i,s,t ∼ N(0, σ2 ):
Ti,s,t = ρi,sTi,s,t−1 + (1− ρi,s)T¯i,s + i,s,t
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Firms hire labor to produce goods. Labor is mobile within a country but immobile
across countries. Thus, the production cost is local wage rate wi. Under perfect compe-
tition, the price of one unit of variety z in country i sector s is
pi,s(z) =
wi
Ai,s(z)
In this two-country world, consumers shop globally for the best deal. The actual price
of z they pay is the lower of the domestic price and the foreign price. In the benchmark
case without trade costs,
pi,s(z) = min{pH,s(z), pF,s(z)}
Aggregating the prices across varieties, I get sectoral prices under the Frechet distri-
bution:
Ps = [Γ(
θ + 1− 
θ
)]
1
1−Φ
− 1
θ
s ≡ γΦ−
1
θ
s where Φs =
∑
i∈{H,F}
Ti,sw
−θ
i
Consequently, piij,s — the trade share of country j’s products in sector s country i —
is equal to the probability that the price of country j’s goods is lower. From its expression
below, trade share increases in productivity Tj,s but decreases in wj the labor cost of the
country.
piij,s =
Tj,sw
−θ
j
Φs
Relative productivity across sectors is different across countries. Without loss of gener-
ality, I assume country H is more productive in sector a and country F is more productive
in b:
T¯H,a
T¯H,b
>
T¯F,a
T¯F,b
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There is an equity market where firms sell their stocks to both domestic and foreign
households. The firms use 1 − α of their revenues to cover labor costs, and pay α as
dividends to their stock owners. In other words, dividends are a constant share (α) of
claims to firms’ output.6
di,s(z) = pi,s(z)yi,s(z)− wi,s(z)li,s(z) = αpi,s(z)yi,s(z)
In the model, households do not choose firm-level equities but country-sector-specific
equities. In total, there are four types of equities, each representing an industry fi,s, (i ∈
H,F , s ∈ a, b). The dividends in sector s country i are a constant share of the sectoral
output:
di,s =
1∫
0
di,s(z)dz = αYi,s
1.3.1.2 Households
A representative agent in country i has constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) pref-
erence in consumption. His objective is to maximize the expected lifetime utility defined
as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−σi,t
1− σ
His consumption bundle consists of his expenditure on the two goods: a and b.7 In the
symmetric case, I assume the weight of the more productive goods in consumption is the
same across countries8. Consumption and aggregate price at home and abroad are given by
6It is isomorphic to the case where production is Cobb-Douglas and dividends are claims to capital
income.
7The CES functional form is similar to many international macroeconomics models on the topic but
the context is different. In one strand, Coeurdacier (2009) and Kollmann (2006) have a consumption
composite of aggregate domestic and aggregate foreign goods. In another strand with multi-sectoral anal-
ysis, Tesar and Stockman (1995) and Matsumoto (2007) have a composite of tradables and nontradables.
In my story, the two goods can be a pair of any two sectors, whether tradable or not. If there is need
to introduce non-tradable features of some particular sectors, I can introduce sector-specific trade costs
τ →∞.
8The symmetry of preference over sectors simplifies the derivation of a closed-form solution. If we
assume ψ > 12 , it means a household consumes more goods in a sector his country is good at producing.
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Ci = (ψ
1
φ
i C
φ−1
φ
i,a + (1− ψi)
1
φC
φ−1
φ
i,b )
φ
φ−1 , Pi = (ψiP
1−φ
i,a + (1− ψi)P 1−φi,b )
1
1−φ
where ψH = 1 − ψF = ψ. Given the CES preference, the expenditure share of country
s in sector i is dependent on sectoral prices: Λi,s,t = ψi,s(
Pi,s,t
Pi,t
)1−φ with ψH,a = ψF,b = ψ
and ψH,b = ψF,a = 1− ψ.
In the stock market, a household purchases the equities in country i sector s at time
t for price qi,s,t. Let νi,s,t denote the number of shares in country i sector s a domestic
household holds at time t, and ν∗i,s,t denote the asset holdings of the foreign household.
Their budget constraints are
PH,tCH,t +
∑
s={a,b}
[qH,s,t(νH,s,t − νH,s,t−1) + qF,s,t(νF,s,t − νF,s,t−1)]
= wH,tLH,t +
∑
s={a,b}
(dH,s,tνH,s,t + dF,s,tνF,s,t) (1.1)
PF,tCF,t +
∑
s={a,b}
[qH,s,t(ν
∗
H,s,t − ν∗H,s,t−1) + qF,s,t(ν∗F,s,t − ν∗F,s,t−1)]
= wF,tLF,t +
∑
s={a,b}
(dH,s,tν
∗
H,i,t + dF,s,tν
∗
F,s,t) (1.2)
The budget constraints state that the sum of consumption expenditures and changes
in equity positions is equal to the sum of labor income and dividend income.
In the labor market, a representative household supplies one unit of labor inelastically.
The amount of labor is fixed in each country, thus we have the market-clearing condition:
Li,a,t + Li,b,t = Li
With the greater size of the productive sector, we arrive at the usual assumption of consumption home
bias commonly seen on the topic. See, for instance, Kollmann (2006) and Heathcote and Perri (2013).
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In the benchmark case, LH = LF = 1. Due to the mobility of labor across sectors,
wage within a country is identical: wi,a,t = wi,b,t = wi,t. Without loss of generality, I
normalize wF,t to one and denote wH,t as wt.
1.3.1.3 Optimal Allocation
In this two-country context, the complete market features perfect risk-sharing across
countries such that an individual country’s consumption is not subject only to its own
income constraint. According to Backus and Smith (1993), the optimal consumption
allocation in the complete market satisfies the condition that the relative marginal utility
across countries equals the consumption-based real exchange rate:
U ′(CH,t)
U ′(CF,t)
=
PH,t
PF,t
= et
The solution to the portfolio choice problem will support this optimal allocation.
1.3.1.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model consists of a sequence of prices such as goods prices
Pi,s,t, Pi,t, Ps,t, wages wH,t, wF,t, wt, asset prices qi,s,t, dividends di,s,t and the real exchange
rate et, as well as a vector of quantities including output Yi,s,t, consumption Ci,s,t, Ci,t,
labor Li,s,t, and asset holdings νi,s,t such that:
(a) Firms choose prices and quantities to maximize their profits;
(b) Households choose consumption and equity holdings to maximize expected lifetime
utility;
(c) Goods market clears:
∑
i={H,F} Yi,s,t =
∑
i={H,F}Ci,s,t;
(d) Factor market clears:
∑
s={a,b} Li,s,t = Li;
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(e) Equity market clears: νi,s,t + ν
∗
i,s,t = 1 for i ∈ {H,F}, s ∈ {a, b}.
(f) Portfolio holdings support the optimal consumption allocations in the complete market.
1.3.2 Portfolio Choice
I apply and extend Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)’s analysis to a case with multiple
sectors in a country, in order to solve for the portfolio choices in the model. To do so,
I log-linearize the model around the steady state (see Appendix A.3.1) and solve for
the portfolio that supports the optimal consumption allocation regardless of the types of
productivity shocks to be realized in the economy. I will start with the partial equilibrium
where I relate portfolio choices to variables’ covariances and then proceed to the general
equilibrium where the portfolio is expressed in terms of parameters in the model.
There are four types of country-sector-pair-specific equities in the domestic households’
portfolio and three unknown weights: the weight of sector a in the portfolio µ and the
weights of domestic assets within each sector Sa, Sb. Thus, the weights of the four assets
fH,a, fH,b, fF,a and fF,b are µSa, µ(1 − Sa), (1 − µ)Sb and (1 − µ)(1 − Sb) respectively.
With the symmetry across countries, foreign asset holdings should be the mirror image of
domestic asset holdings: Sa = S
∗
b , Sb = S
∗
a, µ
∗ = 1 − µ (asterisk is shorthand for foreign
choices). Plugging the result in the static budget constraints of the two countries yields
PHCH = wHLH + µSadH,a + µ(1− Sa)dF,a + (1− µ)SbdH,b + (1− µ)(1− Sb)dF,b (1.3)
PFCF = wFLF + µSadF,b + µ(1− Sa)dH,b + (1− µ)SbdF,a + (1− µ)(1− Sb)dH,a (1.4)
I examine the country’s national home bias by adding up the two budget constraints
(Equation 1.3 and 1.4). Let χ(x1, x2) be the covariance between variable x1 and variable
x2 and χ
2(x) be the variance of variable x. I also denote the sum of the covariances of
variable xˆ with dˆa, dˆa as
∑
χ(xˆ) and the variance of sectoral relative returns as χ2 =
χ2(dˆa) = χ
2(dˆb).
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Proposition I.1. The share of domestic assets in the portfolio is
µSa+(1−µ)Sb = 1
2
+[
σ − 1
2σα
∑
χ(eˆ)−1− α
2α
∑
χ(wˆL)−2µ− 1
2
∑
χ(dˆH)][χ
2+χ(dˆa, dˆb)]
−1
(1.5)
When the households are risk averse, they increase their aggregate domestic holdings to
hedge against real exchange rate risk. Meanwhile, they increase their aggregate foreign
holdings to hedge against labor income risk.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In Equation 1.5, aggregate domestic share (denoted as D hereafter) consists of four
terms: 1
2
,
∑
χ(eˆ),
∑
χ(wˆL) and
∑
χ(dˆH).
1
2
represents households’ diversification mo-
tives across countries. The other three terms capture households’ asset positions driven
by risk-hedging incentives. With χ2 + χ(dˆa, dˆb) > 0, D increases in
∑
χ(eˆ) when σ > 1,
meaning that risk-averse households buy domestic assets to hedge against real exchange
rate risk. The intuition is that when households are risk averse, they have stronger needs
to smooth consumption across time. When local goods are expensive, they do not post-
pone consumption but purchase assets with high returns to stabilize their purchasing
power. As a result, they hold domestic assets as there is a positive correlation between
domestic returns and local prices. Besides, D also decreases in
∑
χ(wˆL), indicating that
households hold foreign assets to hedge against domestic labor income risk. This result
arises from the positive correlation between domestic labor income and domestic asset re-
turns. So far, the conclusions resonate with those in prior works summarized in a generic
form by Coeurdacier and Rey (2013).
What is new in my chapter is the term capturing the covariance between domestic
returns across sectors
∑
χ(dˆH). Its sign determines the relationship between the choice
over sectors and the choice over countries.
Proposition I.2. Sectoral share µ and national share D are substitutes as long as∑
χ(dˆH) > 0. If
∑
χ(dˆH) < 0, µ and D are complements.
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The reasoning is as follows. dˆH is the increase of dH,a relative to that of dH,b. When∑
χ(dˆH) is positive, it means the sum of domestic sectoral returns relative to foreign ones
is increasing in the relative performance of domestic productive sector relative to that of
the domestic unproductive sector. Algebraically,
∑
χ(dˆH) = χ(dˆH , dˆa)+χ(dˆH , dˆb) = χ(dˆH,a−dˆH,b, dˆH,a−dˆF,a)+χ(dˆH,a−dˆH,b, dˆH,b−dˆF,b) > 0
When intra-national gap (dˆH,a − dˆH,b) is widening, so is inter-national gap (dˆH,s −
dˆF,s, s = a, b). The internal condition and the external condition work in the same di-
rection on the relative performance of sector fH,a. fH,a the productive sector at home is
associated with great risks, so aggregate domestic holdings D decrease in aggregate pro-
ductive sectors’ holding µ; Households skew their choice towards foreign assets to globally
diversify the risks arising from favoring the productive sector. In the other case where∑
χ(dˆH) < 0, intranational risk and international risk partially cancel out. For instance,
the improved performance of the productive sector at home deteriorates the relative per-
formance of the home country as a whole. The negative correlation makes domestic assets
a good hedge against the risks associated with the productive sector. Therefore, aggregate
domestic holdings D increase in aggregate sectoral holdings of the productive sector µ.
By adding this interplay between sector choice and country choice, I point to a new
explanation of why national home bias in some countries is high. In an economy with∑
χ(dˆH) > 0, home bias can be high because the country holds many unproductive sec-
tors’ assets so that risk-hedging across sectors replaces the need for risk-hedging across
countries.
Next I analyze the general equilibrium of the model. Households choose the optimal
values of µ, Sa and Sb regardless of the type of shocks to be realized in the economy.
Thus, I solve the portfolio problem by matching the corresponding coefficients after log-
linearizing the model.
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Proposition I.3. In this complete market, sectoral home bias in the general equilibrium
features
Ω1 ≡ µSa − (1− µ)(1− Sb) = − T
T + 1
1− α
α
+
T
T + 1
1
α
(1− 1
σ
)
λ− θ (1.6)
Ω2 ≡ (1− µ)Sb − µ(1− Sa) = − 1
T + 1
1− α
α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor Income Risk
− 1
T + 1
1
α
(1− 1
σ
)
λ− θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exchange Rate Risk
(1.7)
where λ ≡ 1 + θ − φ+ (2ψ − 1)2(φ− 1
σ
)
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the expressions above, Ω1 reflects households’ preference for the domestic productive
sector relative to the foreign productive sector, while Ω2 reflects households’ relative
preference for the domestic unproductive sector over the foreign unproductive sector. The
term −1−α
α
captures households’ hedging against labor income risk in holding equities.
When we add the coefficients before the term across Ω1 and Ω2, we have
T
T+1
+ 1
T+1
= 1. On
the other hand, 1
α
(1− 1
σ
)
λ−θ captures the real exchange rate risk. When we take the difference
between the coefficients before the term across Ω1 and Ω2, we have
T
T+1
− (− 1
T+1
) = 1.
From this analysis, the two sectors within a country achieve intra-national risk-hedging
by (1) alleviating the positive correlation between labor income and financial returns to the
other sector and (2) stabilizing the real exchange rate such that the country’s purchasing
power is not subject to the price fluctuation of the other sector. Therefore, the interaction
between the sectors within a country enriches countries’ risk-hedging patterns.
When we add up Equation 1.6 and 1.7, we find the share of aggregate domestic equities
is
D =
1
2
− 1
2
1− α
α
+
1
2
1
α
T − 1
T + 1
1− 1
σ
λ− θ (1.8)
Equation 1.8 in the general equilibrium is the counterpart to Equation 1.5 in the partial
equilibrium. The first term 1
2
is the diversification term, the second terms captures the
hedging of labor income risk and the third term reflects the hedging of real exchange rate
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risk9. The result is comparable to that in Coeurdacier and Rey (2013), only when we
abstract from the multi-sectoral setting by assuming T goes into infinity.
Therefore, the national home bias of country H follows
HH = 1− 1−D
1/2
= −1− α
α
+
1
α
T − 1
T + 1
1− 1
σ
λ− θ
From the expression, we draw the following conclusion:
Proposition I.4. National home bias decreases in T the productivity disparity.
When there is much productivity disparity between the productive sector and unpro-
ductive sector, the world production and trade are more specialized. Under this circum-
stance, intra-national risk-hedging against real exchange rate risk weakens when T gets
bigger, which in turn induces households to hold more foreign assets for inter-national
risk-hedging. In the extreme case when T = 1, we are back to the Baxter and Jermann
(1997)’s case in the absence of real exchange rate risk. In this case, we ignore sectors’
different ability to influence the exchange rate; Households hold foreign assets only to
deal with labor income risk.
The result predicts that countries with diversified industrial structures have stronger
national home bias than countries with few major industries (which is supported by em-
pirical evidence in Section 1.2.3). Countries like the US have higher national home bias
because they can benefit much from intra-national risk-hedging which dampens their in-
centives to hold foreign assets. But this option is not possible for some oil exporters
because their production is overly concentrated in natural resources. The limited domes-
tic options prompt them to invest abroad.
Productivity is not only related to the choice over countries but also to the choice over
9When the elasticity of substitution between tradable sectors is above unity (Literature including
Levchenko and Zhang (2011) set it equal to 2.), λ < θ always holds.
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sectors. When we take the difference between Equation 1.6 and 1.7, we find
µ =
1
2
− 1
2
T − 1
T + 1
1− α
α
+
1
2
1
α
1− 1
σ
λ− θ (1.9)
Proposition I.5. The share of the more productive sector decreases in T the productivity
disparity.
The greater T , the greater labor income risk is associated with the productive sector.
Households respond by favoring the assets in the unproductive sector. In the extreme case
where T = 1, we are back to Coeurdacier (2009)’s case in the absence of labor income
risk. In this case, we ignore sectors’ different ability to influence labor income; Households
choose assets in the unproductive sector only to hedge against real exchange rate risk.
This result indicates that countries with concentrated industrial structures should
avoid assets of their major industries. Otherwise price fluctuations in productive sectors
will cause drastic shifts in the households’ labor income. For instance, Qatar and Nor-
way should diversify their investment among different industries besides oil. In contrast,
countries with diversified industrial structures have more income stabilizers at home, so
their preference for productive sectors in the portfolio will not cause fatal problems. An
example is that Germany and the US do not need to avoid investing in the auto industry
to hedge risks.
So far, I have extended Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)’s analysis to a case with multiple
sectors. In the next section, I will use Devereux and Sutherland (2007)’s method to solve
for sectoral home bias and examine how it varies with productivity disparity T .
1.3.3 Sectoral Home Bias
Devereux and Sutherland (2007, 2011) combine a second-order approximation of the
portfolio Euler equation with a first-order approximation of other equations in the model
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to calculate the static portfolio. Around the steady state of this economy, the approach
offers a unique solution where a country’s holdings of a sector’s assets at home and abroad
add up to zero.
Since the analytical results are not illustrative enough, I analyze comparative statics
graphically to examine the effect of productivity on sectoral home bias. I get the values
for most of the parameters from previous literature in trade and macroeconomics. For
instance, Eaton and Kortum (2002) measure technology dispersion θ to be 8.28. Levchenko
and Zhang (2011) set the elasticity of substitution between broad sectors φ equal to 2.
Assumptions about discount factor and technology process are standard. I also assume the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is 2 and the weight of productive sectors in consumption
is 0.6.10 In sum, parameter values are listed in Table 1.3.3.
Figure 1.6 plots domestic households’ holdings of domestic assets, where the black
Table 1.3: Parametrization in the Benchmark Case
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.95
σ coefficient of relative risk aversion 2
θ technological dispersion in the EK model 8.28
ρ coefficient of autocorrelation in technology 0.9
σa standard deviation of productivity shocks .025
ψ weight of the productive sectors’ goods in consumption 0.6
ρ elasticity of substitution between sectors 2
line is the position of the domestic productive sector and the grey line is the position of
the domestic unproductive sector. The holdings of foreign assets are the mirror image of
the holdings of domestic assets in the same sector. The unit on the y-axis is the share of
the asset in the steady state home income Y¯H . T =
T¯H,a
T¯H,b
measures the strength of relative
productivity.
When I increase the value of T from 1 to 3, νH,a decreases and νH,b increases, while
νH,a is consistently below νH,b. With the increase in T , countries are more specialized in
10Appendix D shows that the results of sectoral home bias basically stay the same qualitatively under
different parametrization of these two variables.
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Figure 1.6: Sectoral Home Bias and Relative Productivity T
production and trade. Thus, the productive sector fH,a is even more exposed to risks. In
response, domestic households sell more assets in sector fH,a and increase their holdings
of fH,b.
In order to further explain the mechanism, Table 1.3.3 lists the correlations between
asset returns (ri,s, i ∈ {H,F}, s ∈ {a, b}) and labor income (wL) as well as exchange
rate (e) when T = 3. From the two rows of the table, rH,a has the greatest correlations,
followed by rF,b and then rH,b, while rF,a has the least correlations with w and e. The
risk-hedging motives prompt households to hold the assets that have the least correlations
while avoiding those with the greatest correlations with labor income. Consequently,
households prefer fH,b and fF,a to fF,b and fH,a. This accounts for the greater home bias
in sector b than in sector a.
To sum up, sectoral home bias is stronger in unproductive sectors than in productive
sectors. Households sell short more of domestic productive sectors’ assets for hedging
purposes. The difference in sectoral home bias between a and b increases in the relative
productivity T .
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Table 1.4: Asset Returns’ Correlations with Labor Income and Real Exchange Rate
rH,a rH,b rF,a rF,b
ρ(wL, ri,s) 0.1896 0.1393 -0.0359 0.1405
ρ(e, ri,s) 0.2142 0.1613 -0.0202 0.2292
Note: This table lists the correlation between the
sectoral financial returns of country i sector s and
the real exchange rate e as well as the domestic labor
income wL.
1.3.4 Dynamic Analysis
In this section, I study the dynamics of the economy in response to sectoral produc-
tivity shocks. I start with macroeconomic variables and then proceed to asset positions.
Figure 1.7 compares the influence of a one-standard deviation sectoral productivity
shock at home on relative output, consumption, wage earnings and exchange rate across
countries.
The aggregate domestic output relative to foreign output rises in response to the
sectoral productivity shocks at home. Adjusted for different standard deviations across
sectors, the effect of a 1% increase in the productivity of the productive sector (TH,a) will
be greater than that of the unproductive sector (TH,b). Since labor income constitutes a
constant proportion of aggregate output, we observe a similar trend in the impulse re-
sponse of the relative wage.
Shifts in TH,a and TH,b affect the relative consumption at home as well as the real
exchange rate in the opposite direction. A positive productivity shock in the productive
sector depresses the domestic consumption and depreciates the home purchasing pow-
er. This is due to the fact that the productivity boost in the productive sector worsens
the weighted terms-of-trade of the home country, impacting its ability to consume and
to purchase. Whereas a productivity enhancement in the unproductive sector improves
terms-of-trade and boosts consumption.
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We can also use the method in Devereux and Sutherland (2011) to analyze dynamic
portfolio choices 11. Figure 1.8 depicts the dynamics of country H’s holdings of sectoral
domestic assets (νH,s, s ∈ {a, b}), aggregate domestic assets (νH) and aggregate produc-
tive sectors’ assets at home and abroad (νa).
In the first two subplots where there is productivity improvement in either domestic
sector fH,s, s ∈ {a, b}, households lower their holdings of that particular sector on impact.
Whether the other sector at home can absorb some of the outflow depends on its relative
productivity. In the graph, νH,b is almost unchanged by a TH,a shock, while νH,a goes up
significantly and permanently when TH,b changes. In the former case, νH,b in the steady
state already carries much responsibility in risk hedging. Thus, a productivity shock to
the domestic productive sector fH,a is anticipated and accounted for by the optimal set-
ting of νH,b in the first place. In the latter case, νH,a does not play as important a role
in risk hedging as νH,b does. Hence, when a shock happens to fH,b, νH,a has to increase
significantly to offset the decrease in νH,b , in which process it takes over the responsibility
of stabilizing the real exchange rate and labor income. Another way to illustrate the point
is that there is less productivity disparity across sectors at home with the boost of TH,b,
so sector fH,a becomes less risky and attracts more investment.
The aggregate domestic holdings νH (shown in subplot 3) give us a sense of portfolio
adjustment across countries. Domestic shares decrease on impact with any positive pro-
ductivity shock at home, due to the fact that the home country suffers a surprise initial
loss of wealth due to their negative holdings of domestic assets. After 30 periods, holdings
gradually converge to a new steady state. Whether it is higher than the original one de-
pends on the productivity of the sector that experiences the shock. If what changes is TH,a,
domestic households want to cut their aggregate domestic holdings further as domestic
11The mechanism of the method can be traced back to Samuelson (1970) who states that anN+2 degree
of approximation of an investors’ objective function can capture the N th order of portfolio behaviour. In
solving the steady state (zero-order) portfolio problem, we combine the second-order approximation of
the portfolio choice equation with the first-order approximation of the equations describing the economy.
In solving the dynamic (first-order) portfolio problem, we combine the third-order approximation of
portfolio choice equation and the second-order approximation of other equations in the model.
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risks are strengthened with the productive sector’s rising productivity. If TH,b changes,
domestic holdings increase since the improvement of the unproductive sector eliminates
some of the risks because now the two sectors are more even and more intra-country risk
hedging becomes possible.
The last subplot in Figure 1.8 shows the change in νa (the sum of νH,a and νF,a).
νa increases when there is a positive shock to TH,b. The strengthening of the unproduc-
tive sector at home alleviates the positive covariance between labor income and financial
returns to sector a’s assets. Consequently, households increase the holdings of sector a
which is exposed to less risks than before. The last two subplots reaffirm the validity of
Proposition I.4 and Proposition I.5.
1.3.5 Model Extension
In this section, I extend the baseline model by incorporating nontradability. To do so,
I impose sector-specific trade costs (τ → ∞) on b and turn the model into an economy
with a tradable sector (a) and a nontradable sector (b). Meanwhile I also relax the as-
sumption of symmetric preferences across countries. Table 1.3.5 compares the results in
the baseline case and the case with nontradables.
Table 1.5: Asset Holdings with and without Nontradables
Baseline Model Model with Nontradables
Macro Correlations ρ(YH , YF ) 0.38 0.36
ρ(CH , CF ) 0.81 0.39
Asset Holdings νH,a -10.81 -10.15
νH,b -1.40 13.67
From the table, we find the cross-country correlations of consumption ρ(CH , CF ) and
output ρ(YH , YF ) are lower with the introduction of nontradables, since nontradables are
consumed and produced locally.
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Regarding asset holdings, while domestic holdings are negative in the baseline model,
they turn positive for the nontradable sector in the extended model. International risk
sharing has been greatly impaired, thus households do not circumvent domestic assets as
before. Of the two domestic assets, investors prefer fH,b the nontradable sector. Investors
have little incentive to hold foreign assets in nontradable sectors because they do not
benefit much from linking consumption to returns in nontradable sectors. The result is
consistent with those in other papers on the topic such as Matsumoto (2007) and Collard
et al. (2007)12.
1.4 Application: Trade Expansion and Foreign Investment
In this section, I elaborate on an application of the model to provide additional ev-
idence on how countries’ industrial structure drives their choice between domestic and
foreign assets.
The model argues that the growth of productive sectors accumulates a country’s do-
mestic risks. Many emerging markets like China and Brazil are more productive in their
tradable sectors and these countries’ exports have been growing rapidly. Therefore, the
investors’ concerns for the mounting domestic risks prompt them to hold developed coun-
tries’ assets. Hence, we observe the surge of South-North capital flows in recent decades
despite the relatively high domestic returns in developing countries. This chapter pro-
vides one explanation for this phenomenon by linking the trade channel and the financial
channel.
I use China as an example. The past decade has witnessed not only China’s rising role
as a world producer but also its rapid expansion in foreign portfolio investment. My mod-
el suggests that the coexistence of the two phenomena is not coincidence but causation
12My model is a more general representation of previous work, encompassing both tradables of different
productivity and nontrable sectors.
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instead. To illustrate how the mechanism works, I do a numerical exercise calibrated to
the Chinese data to see how trade expansion in the recent decades drives capital outflow.
I assume there are two countries (China and the U.S.) and two sectors (tradables and
nontradables). As is argued in the model extension part (Section 1.3.5), this setup is in
line with Matsumoto (2007) and Collard et al. (2007). So I choose my parametrization
(listed in Table 1.6) similar to theirs to make our results comparable.
The data of bilateral trade between China and the U.S. are from the Census Bureau,
while the data of China’s equity holding in the U.S. are from the Department of Trea-
sury. China’s data on setoral output and trade are obtained from the National Bureau of
Statistics of China. Since the equity data are only available since 2003, I will focus my
analysis on the past decade.
When I calibrate the model, I choose time-varying weights of domestic goods in the
tradable basket (ωi,t) to match the data of China’s exports as shares of GDP every year.
Then I calculate the implied holdings of foreign assets based on the calibration. Finally,
I compare the data of China’s holdings of U.S. equities and the results in my simulation
to evaluate the performance of the model.
Table 1.6: Parametrization
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.95
σ coefficient of relative risk aversion 2
φ elasticity of substitution b/w tradables and nontradables .5
φt elasticity of substitution b/w domestic and foreign traded goods 1.5
ψt weight of tradables in consumption 0.5
Figure 1.9 shows the comparison between simulation and data pertaining to China’s
historical holdings of U.S. equities (expressed as a percentage of long-run average values
during the period). 13 The model does a good job of capturing the trends of the asset
13In data, the holdings were low and stable before 2006 because China set strict restriction on foreign
investment. In April 2006, the Chinese government launched QDII (Qualified Domestic Institutional
Investor) scheme which allowed qualified institutions to hold foreign securities.
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holdings14.15 Overall, China’s equity holdings have grown persistently over time with their
trade expansion. There is a sudden drop of asset holdings around the 2009 global financial
crisis. The drop in my simulation is not obtained by the assumption of any exogenous
monetary or real shocks but by the fall in China’s exports alone. At the time, bilateral
trade ties deteriorate during the financial crisis. Meanwhile China’s tradable sector is
less vulnerable to real exchange rate risk and labor income risk. Consequently, Chinese
investors have less hedging motives to invest abroad, which prompts them to switch from
foreign equities to domestic equities. After the financial crisis, their holdings of US assets
recover due to the rebuilt trade relationship.
This exercise shows that the South-North capital movement can be driven by the e-
merging markets’ trade expansion. It also corroborates the main argument of the chapter
that industrial structures affect countries’ home bias.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I illustrate whether sectoral productivity drives a country’s portfolio
choice and explain why. I show empirically and theoretically that industrial structure af-
fects equity home bias both at the industry level and at the country level. The framework
I build in this model has wide applications in international economics.
In future research, I will modify the method I use to solve for the optimal portfolio.
Devereux and Sutherland (2007, 2011) introduce a powerful tool in capturing the relative
patterns of asset holdings, but the method has the following short-comings that prevent
it from capturing the absolute moments. First, there is no short-sale constraint in the
14The correlation between data and simulation is .85. The adjusted R-squared from a regression of
data on simulation is .69. Both indicate the model is successful in predicting the trend of real data on
equity holdings.
15Although the magnitude of the simulation is much greater than that of the real data. This is partly
due to the assumption of complete market and the absence of short-sale constraint, as well as the log-
linearizing solution method. The great magnitude of asset holdings is typical in this strand of literature.
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baseline setup so that agents may hold negative assets in the model. This assumption is
not valid in many real situations, so it is necessary to extend the technique by embed-
ding a non-negative constraint. Second, the method solves for the optimal asset holdings
around the steady state of the model, which makes it hard to apply it to a case with
multiple equilibria or no equilibrium. Coeurdacier et al. (2011) among others also discuss
the problem.
The model itself can be extended in the following directions to better capture the real-
ity of international capital flows. First, I will build and solve a full-fledged multi-country
multi-sector model with a carefully calibrated numerical exercise to do both cross-sectional
and time series analyses of home bias. Second, we can introduce corporate debt into the
model to investigate the complementarity as well as the substitutability between debt
and equity. Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) discuss the difference between debt and
equity at the national level, but the picture will be different at the industry level with
corporate instead of government debt. Third, we can incorporate institutional and infor-
mation frictions in the portfolio choice problem. Despite the fact that these two factors
mainly work at the national level, there exists cross-industry variation as is pointed out
by Schumacher (2012). Fourth, my model abstracts from physical capital. We can intro-
duce capital goods and dynamic investment to match the characteristics of a production
economy better. A good example in this direction is Heathcote and Perri (2013) who
argue that the correlation between labor income and capital income affects the hedging
ability of financial assets and hence changes investors’ equity positions. By including these
extensions, future research will provide us with a better understanding of the interplay
between industrial structure and home bias.
35
Figure 1.7: Impulse Responses to Productivity Shocks
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Figure 1.8: Asset Holdings in Response to Productivity Shocks
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Figure 1.9: China’s Historical Holdings of U.S. Equities
Note: This figure presents both simulated and actual China’s holdings of US equities
from 2003 to 2013. The green line is the simulated holdings I get by calibrating the
model to match China’s exports. The blue line is the actual data from the US Census
Bureau. Both are expressed as a percentage of long-run average values during the
period. The correlation between data and simulation is 0.85.
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CHAPTER II
Optimal Trade Costs after Sovereign Defaults
This paper offers new theoretical and empirical insights into the effect of sovereign
defaults on trade. Empirical evidence from the changes in trade shares after debt rene-
gotiations as well as Aid-for-trade statistics indicates that sovereign debt renegotiation is
not associated with trade sanctions but with trade incentives offered by creditor countries
to debtor countries. Using a two-country DSGE model with incomplete financial markets,
we are able to explain why trade sanctions are not observed. Our model departs from the
existing literature on sovereign defaults by building on the strategic interaction between
debtors and creditors. We reason that creditors lower trade costs with debtors in hopes of
collecting the remaining debt during debt renegotiations. The adjustment in turn affects
debtors’ default decisions. The model departs from the existing literature on sovereign
defaults by building on the strategic interaction between debtors and creditors. We solve
the model numerically to determine the optimal trade costs given different combinations
of debt and income levels.
2.1 Introduction
The danger of default exists with every financial loan, and sovereign debt is no ex-
ception. Holders of sovereign debt face additional uncertainty stemming from the lack of
supernational legal entities. The recent debt crises in Europe and Latin America have
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demonstrated the need to study both creditors’ and debtors’ incentives and decisions in
the initiation, negotiation and settlement process of sovereign debt contracts. This chap-
ter aims to contribute to the discussion by focusing on a novel mechanism that has been
overlooked in previous work.
Globalization since the second half the twentieth century has featured both trade lib-
eralization and financial mobility across borders. The two channels should not be studied
in isolation, as both are important sources of individual countries’ economic develop-
ment as well as world risk sharing. As Tomz and Wright (2013) point out, theoretical
models are missing while empirical evidence is ambiguous over how trade and sovereign
default interact. Our paper addresses this gap in the literature by providing new empirical
and theoretical results that bring together the trade and borrowing channels to explain
sovereign default settlement.
Trade, in previous literature on sovereign default, has played a trivial if any role. For
instance, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue that default may lead to a decline in internation-
al trade, which is interpreted as a constant output loss in their model. Their approach
is followed in the majority of sovereign default papers including Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), Yue (2010) , Bai and Zhang (2010), to name just a few. Tomz and Wright (2013)
summarize three reasons why trade could suffer after default happens: (1) creditors’ trade
restrictions as a means of punishment (a.k.a. trade sanction), (2) the collapse of trade
credit, and (3) creditors’ asset seizures. None of these reasons can be captured by direct
output loss, let alone the strategic behaviors that arise from these features. Instead, our
paper will focus on how trade costs may change before and after sovereign defaults.
Rose (2005) explains empirically the cost of trade after sovereign default. Using
government-to-government debt default information from the Paris Club, he finds that
debt renegotiations have significantly negative effects on contemporaneous and lagged
trade volume in a gravity regression. We find his results inspiring and intriguing but not
fully explored. Trade volume will naturally fall with the deterioration of economic terms,
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which may not be fully picked up by the gravity variables. It is the relative share instead
of the absolute value of trade that measures the existence and severity of punishment in
the bilateral borrowing relationship. We replicate Rose’s analysis on an expanded dataset
that includes fifteen additional years. Similar to Rose (2005) we find that trade volume
falls, but we also find that trade share increases significantly (by around 5%) after debt
renegotiation happens. This is a surprising result that runs contrary to the traditional
trade sanction arguments.
Novy (2013) argues that trade share can be used to infer time-varying bilateral trade
costs directly from the model’s gravity equation without imposing arbitrary trade cost
functions. Based on this argument, we hypothesize trade costs change as a creditor’s re-
action to debt renegotiation. As there lacks comprehensive and consistent data on direct
measurement of trade costs, we resort to OECD’s data on aid for trade and find there
is noticeable increase in trade-related assistance from creditors when debt renegotiation
happens. This is complementary evidence for lower trade costs after defaults.
Our findings lead us to rethink creditors’ incentives: why would creditors be willing
to lower their trade costs with defaulters? In practice, before a default reaches its final
resolution, there is a renegotiation stage where the creditor and the debtor could agree
on debt settlement based on the current income of the debtor and the size of the debt.
Our hypothesis is that in the renegotiation stage, it is sometimes optimal for the creditor
to lower trade costs so that the debtor is more likely to service the debt.
We build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to develop our hypothesis.
Our model differs from a standard sovereign default model in the following ways. First,
it is a two-country model instead of a small open economy. Additionally, because we are
interested in whether the model’s prediction of trade shares can match our empirical find-
ings, we will study a creditor-debtor two-country model integrated with a world market.
Second, our model includes a trade component. The consumption bundle in a country con-
sists of domestic goods, financial partners’ (whether it be creditor or debtor) goods, and
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the goods from the world market, with an elasticity of substitution among them. Third,
creditors are risk averse. Creditors in most sovereign default models are risk-neutral and
perfectly competitive for tractability reasons, so that bond prices are directly linked to the
world interest rate once default probability is computed. This assumption will be relaxed
in our model as we assume a concave utility function. We compute a market-clearing
bond price under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
In our story, the amount creditors hope to collect from debtors induces the adjustment
of bilateral trade costs. At the same time, the change in trade costs affects debtors’ prob-
ability to service the debt. At the end of the day, default probabilities, bond prices and
optimal trade costs are all endogenously derived as the solution to the general equilibrium
model. Trade and debt channels are more correlated and interactive in our model than
in any previous work.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we identify an interesting but overlooked phe-
nomenon through our empirical analysis, which calls the widely-accepted trade sanction
argument into question. Second, we propose a new mechanism which links bilateral trade
and bilateral borrowing. Third, we develop computation techniques that allow us to nu-
merically solve a sovereign default model with more realistic features, such as risk-averse
creditors.
In our new approach, we have maintained several important features from previous
work. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) propose financial autarky as a means to support
debtors’ incentive to repay the debt. In our model, defaulters are also denied access to
new loans. In terms of empirical analysis, our paper is in line with Martinez and Sandleris
(2011) who find that debtors’ bilateral trade with creditor countries does not fall more
than trade with other countries. On the computation side, we follow Hatchondo et al.
(2010)’s recommendation and use cubic spline interpolation rather than discrete state s-
pace technique to approximate the value functions to reduce computational burdens. Our
paper is also related to the recent work of Gu (2015) but with a different focus. She
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introduces vertical integration in production between a creditor and a debtor to examine
the dynamics of terms of trade and trade volume, while our work aims to provide an
answer to the optimal trade costs a creditor imposes on a debtor after debt renegotiations
take place.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical
findings. Section 3 describes the model as well as the properties of the recursive equi-
librium. Section 4 elaborates on the algorithm, parameterizations and numerical results.
Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present our findings about the effect of sovereign defaults on trade.
We are interested in the dynamics of trade shares after debt renegotiations. Trade share
is a more accurate measure of trade sanctions or benefits than trade volume: if there
were trade sanctions, creditors would disproportionably depress their trade with debtors.
Hence, trade sanctions indicate lower creditor-debtor trade shares after debt renegotia-
tions.
Following Rose (2005), we track sovereign default episodes since 1956 from the Paris
Club. It is an informal group of financial officials from 19 of the world’s biggest economies,
which provides financial services such as war funding, debt restructuring, debt relief and
debt cancellation to indebted countries and their creditors. We recognize that there are
diverse forms of international lending besides the debt exchanges between governments1
, yet the Paris Club has remained a central player in the resolution of developing and e-
merging countries’ debt problems. We can track the date, list of creditors, amount of debt
and terms of treatment. Another reason that we only consider government-to-government
1Besides government to government bilateral debt under the Paris Club umbrella, debtor countries
also issue commercial bank debt under the London Club, or issue bond debt. For detailed elaboration
and comparison of different forms of sovereign debts, see Das et al. (2012).
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Figure 2.1: Shares of Debtors’ Goods in Creditors’ and Non-creditors’ Imports
bilateral agreements is that private lending does not have as direct impact as public lend-
ing on trade flows. After all, governments are the major players to design trade policies
and sign trade treaties.
Before we move to regression analysis, it is intuitive to show graphically changes in
trade shares around sovereign default periods. In Figure 2.1, we plot the share of debtors’
goods in creditors’ and non-creditors’ imports, averaged across all the default episodes.
Trade share reaches its trough in the default year (denoted as zero on the x-axis) when
debtors’ economies experience the hardest hit. However, it is noticeable that debtors’
trade with creditors is able to recover sooner and better than that with non-creditors:
while the trade share in non-creditors’ imports is lower than the level before defaults,
the trade share in creditors’ imports bounces back and even higher than the level before
defaults.
I herein use a panel regression to quantify the effect of sovereign defaults on trade.
The first step we take is to replicate Rose’s (2005) results with fifteen more years of data.
The original gravity model in Rose (2005) is
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1ln(YiYj)t + β2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t + β3lnDij + β4Langij
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+β5Contij + β6FTAijt + β7Landlij + β8Islandij + β9ln(AreaiAreaj)
+β10ComColij + β11CurColijt + β12Colonyij + β13ComNatij + β14CUijt
+β15,0IMFijt +
∑
k
β15,kIMFijt−k + φRENEGijt +
∑
m
φmRENEGijt−m + ijt
Xijt is the trade flow between country i and j at time t. Y denotes real GDP and
Pop denotes population, so that Y/Pop is income per capita. Dij represents the distance
between i and j and Area represents a country’s land mass. Binary variables include
Lang (common language), Cont (common border), FTA (regional trade agreement),
ComCol (common colonizer after 1945), CurCol (colonies at time t), ComNat (part of
the same nation at time t) and CU (same currency). Landl and Island are the numbers
of landlocked and island countries in the country pair, which take the value of 0,1, or 2.
RENEGijt is a dummy variable which is unity if i and j renegotiate debt at time t and
zero otherwise. IMFijt is one(two) if one (both) of i or(and) j begin an IMF program at
t and zero otherwise. Lagged RENEG and lagged IMF are also listed as explanatory
variables, considering the change in trade flow is a gradual and persistent process.
Our first goal is to extend Rose’s data by 15 years to reflect the recent trends in
sovereign defaults. In collecting the data, we do our best to choose similar, if not the
same data sources as Rose, in order to make the results consistent and comparable. We
get the trade data from the ‘Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)’ dataset by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). The values are in current US dollars. We deflate them
by the US CPI (82-84=100) from BLS to get the real value. GDP and population data
are taken from World Bank’s ‘World Development Indicator’. In the case of missing val-
ues, we turn to Penn World Table. Values of other common gravity variables including
distance, contiguity, language and colonization are available in the CEPII dataset2. The
information about regional trade agreements is updated with the records from the World
2It is a square gravity dataset for all pairs of countries, downloadable at http://econ.sciences-
po.fr/thierry-mayer
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Trade Organization. Lastly, we get the list for the IMF programs from Axel Dreher. See
Table 5 in the Appendix for detailed categories.
Our results about trade volumes are similar to Rose’s, in both the sign and magnitude
of the estimated coefficients. Table 1 lists the estimates in fixed-effect and random-effect
models with contemporaneous and fifteen lags of RENEG, the dummy variable of debt
renegotiation. In all the cases (i.e. bilateral trade, trade from debtor to creditor (denoted
as country1to2), and trade from creditor to debtor (country2to1)), the linearly-combined
coefficients of contemporaneous and lagged debt renegotiation —
∑15
t=1RENEG — are all
negative, whether we employ a fixed-effect or random-effect model. This result indicates
that bilateral trade volumes between a creditor and a debtor decrease after a sovereign
default.
Table 2.1:
Linearly Combined Contemporaneous and Lagged Effects of Debt Renegotia-
tion on Trade Volumes
Coefficient Std. Err. t [95 percent Conf. Interval]
bilateral FE -1.098 0.118 -9.300 -1.329 -0.867
bilateral RE -1.608 0.119 -13.490 -1.842 -1.375
trade 1to2 FE -1.416 0.150 -9.460 -1.710 -1.123
trade 1to2 RE -2.177 0.151 -14.410 -2.473 -1.881
trade 2to1 FE -1.426 0.144 -9.930 -1.708 -1.145
trade 2to1 RE -1.891 0.144 -13.090 -2.174 -1.608
After replicating Rose’s original results, we go a step further to analyze trade shares.
We believe it is the relative but not the absolute change in trade that reflects the existence
and severity of trade sanctions after defaults take place. To this end, we create two
variables: Impw1to2 is the share of creditors’ goods in debtors’ imports, and Impw2to1
is the share of debtors’ goods in creditors’ imports. Then we replace trade volumes with
these two measures as the dependent variable in the regression.
In addition, we add exchange rates as an independent variable as currency depreciation
may bias the results. For instance, the collapse of South America during the 1970’s debt
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crisis affected the currency values of nearly all the countries in the whole region. The
covariance between exchange rates across Latino countries was different from that between
Latino countries and developed countries, which mattered for the change in trade shares.
To correct this bias, we collect data on exchange rates from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS). The original data are in the units of currency per US dollars, which can
be converted to obtain bilateral exchange rates between two arbitrary currencies.
Table 2.2: Linearly Combined Effects of Debt Renegotiation on Trade Share
Coefficient Std. Err. t p > |t| [95 percent Conf. Interval]
share 2in1 0.0590 0.0048 12.2000 0.0000 0.0495 0.0684
share 1in2 0.0628 0.0047 13.4600 0.0000 0.0537 0.0720
Table 2 lists the regression results in the fixed-effect model. We present the coeffi-
cient and the standard error of
∑15
t=1RENEG, the linear combination of coefficients on
paris,paris1-15. From the table, we find that debt renegotiations have significantly pos-
itive effect on trade shares; a sovereign default episode is associated with a 5% increase
in the share of debtors’ goods in creditors’ imports. This number is impressive, given
the number of trade partners available nowadays in the integrated world market. We
believe this increase in trade shares indicates that sovereign defaults do not lead to trade
sanctions, but are instead associated with trade benefits.
Trade shares have been used by trade economists to uncover trade costs. This ap-
proach is developed by Head and Ries (2001) and extended by Novy (2013), who derives
a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs that indirectly infers trade frictions from
observable trade data. The measure turns out to be consistent with a broad range of
leading trade theories including Ricardian and heterogeneous-firm models. The bilateral
comprehensive trade costs are calculated as
τij = (
XiiXjj
XijXji
)
1
2(σ−1) − 1
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where Xij and Xji denote bilateral trade, while Xii and Xjj denote domestic expenditure.
τij represents the geometric average of trade costs between countries i and j relative to
domestic trade costs within each country. Its value reflects the additional costs that trad-
ing goods between i and j involves, as compared to when the two countries trade these
goods within their borders. It covers tariffs, transportation costs, and other unobservable
trade barriers. It is straightforward to see an increase in trade shares is equivalent to a
decrease in trade costs. Thus, based on the increase in trade shares, we hypothesize that
bilateral trade costs between creditors and debtors decrease after defaults happen.
While our argument will be stronger if we can support our hypothesis with a consistent
and continuous data set of visible and invisible trade costs, such data set is rare.3 Al-
ternatively, we turn to OECD’s Aid-for-trade dataset to see whether the efforts to boost
bilateral trade are strengthened when debt renegotiations happen. We restrict our at-
tention to the categories of aid that are directly related to trade policy adjustment (See
Table 7 for details). Figure A13 plots the change in creditors’ trade-related aid to debtors
around the following three default episodes: Honduras (2004), Congo (2008) and Burundi
(2009). In the years of sovereign defaults, creditors double or triple their trade-related
aid to help defaulters out. Instead of trade sanctions, they offer generous trade benefits.
These case studies serve as indirect evidence for our hypothesis that creditors lower trade
costs with defaulters.
To sum up the empirical section, sovereign renegotiation is associated with increased
bilateral trade shares between debtors and creditors. This empirical result, in line with
Martinez and Sandleris (2011), contradicts the prediction of the trade sanction theory.
Based on Novy (2013)’s trade costs theory and Aid-for-trade data, we believe bilateral
trade costs decrease after debt renegotiations.
3Bilateral tariff and non-tariff data from the World Bank’s WITS are discontinuous and available
only for the past decade. Trade costs in our paper are broader in definition, so it is hard to find direct
comprehensive evidence.
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2.3 Model
In the empirical section, we challenge the conventional trade sanction theory of sovereign
default. Our explanation for this interesting observation is that a creditor is willing to
compromise in the trade channel in order to minimize its loss from the financial side. In
other words, when the creditor finds the debtor on the brink of defaulting, it is willing
to lower trade costs to boost the debtor’s exports such that the debtor is more likely to
service the debt. The reduced trade costs will in turn determine a debtor’s willingness
to repay. Our model features this strategic interaction between the two parties in the
Markov perfect equilibrium.
2.3.1 Model Environment
In the model, there is a creditor, a debtor and the rest of the world (ROW). Although
commonly used for sovereign default problems, a model with a small open economy is
not able to capture the strategic interaction between countries. Meanwhile, a standard
two-country model is not helpful in studying the trade shares after sovereign defaults.
To this end, we will build a creditor-debtor two-country model integrated with a world
market (or ROW).
The creditor and the debtor are endowment economies with goods specific to country
i = c, d (c denotes the creditor and d denotes the debtor). For simplicity, we assume the
income of the creditor A¯ is constant over time and large enough for the country to always
be the lender. Meanwhile, the income of the debtor follows an AR(1) process:
yt = ρyyt−1 + (1− ρy)y¯ + t
with its long-run mean y¯ and innovation t ∼ N(0, σ2).
Other than the two countries, there is a world market that both countries can interact
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with. Specifically, this market consists of two parts — financial and goods markets. In the
world financial market, there is a risk-free asset called world bond with rate r. Meanwhile,
the world goods market supplies one kind of consumption good. For simplicity, we assume
a country can trade one-for-one domestic goods for goods in the world market: ciw = cwi.
Country i’s objective is to maximize its expected lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−γi,t
1− γ
where utility takes the form of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) with consumption
Ci,t = [θiic
ρ
ii,t + θijc
ρ
ij,t + (1− θii − θij)cρiw,t]
1
ρ
The consumption composite of country i consists of domestic goods (cii), foreign goods
(cij) and world goods (ciw) with elasticity of substitution
1
1−ρ . We further assume prefer-
ence is symmetric across countries θii = θii = θh and θij = θji = θf . The market clearing
condition of goods i states that
cii + cji + cwi = yi
Let pii represent the price of goods i in its source country. There is a trade cost τij > 1
imposed by country i on goods coming from country j, reflecting trade restrictions like
tariffs. Thus, the effective price of imports from country j to country i is pij = τijpjj.
As we are mainly interested in the impact of creditor’s trade policies on debtor’s default
decisions, we assume τdc ≡ 1. An implication of this assumption is that there is no trade
retaliation on the debtor’s side. On the other hand, the creditor has some flexibility in
adjusting trade costs τcd,∈ [τ , τ ]. Tariffs also become part of the creditor’s income for the
model to yield a non-corner solution to τcd. As we will show later, τcd is a crucial policy
instrument that affects not only bilateral trade but also bilateral debt. Lastly, the trade
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costs between a country and the rest of the world are set equal to zero for simplicity:
τiw = τwi = 1, i = {c, d}.
The debtor issues one-period risky bonds to the creditor. The bond market features
limited enforcement since the debtor can default on its debt. There are two default states
(S0, S1) :
State 0 (S0): The debtor repays the bilateral debt previously and retains its financial ties
with the creditor.
State 1 (S1): The debtor defaults previously and is stuck in financial autarky.
In S0, the debtor chooses from two default options (D ∈ {D0, D1}). It either services
the debt (D0) and stays in S0, or defaults (D1) and downgrades to financial autarky in
the next period. In S1, it no longer issues debt and consumes its endowment.
The timeline of the model is summarized in Figure 2. At the beginning of period t,
the debtor can issue risky bond b to the creditor if it is in S0. The creditor lends money,
chooses risk-free asset bc from the world financial market and sets trade cost τ . When
the one-period bond matures at t + 1, the debtor observes the realization of its current
endowment and chooses either to repay the debt so as to stay in S0, or to default and move
to S1. Meanwhile the creditor sets τ
′ based on state variables b, bc and y. If the debtor
defaults previously, it is in financial autarky (S1). Following Aguiar and Gopinath (2006),
there is an exogenous probability λ for the debtor in S1 to regain access to borrowing.
Figure 2.2: Timeline
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2.3.2 Recursive Equilibrium
The state space of the model consists of default states s ∈ S = {S0, S1} and a set
of fundamental macroeconomic variables including the debtor’s income, bilateral bond
holdings and the creditor’s wealth w. Denote the set as x = (y, b, w) ∈ X. Agents’ value
functions and decision rules will depend on S ×X. In this section, we solve for the cred-
itor’s and the debtor’s problems and define the equilibrium of the model.
2.3.2.1 Debtor’s Problem
In S0, the debtor enters a period with b and observes the endowment realization y. If
it chooses not to default, it issues a new bond b′ at the price q(y, b′, w) (denominated in
the debtor’s goods price). If it chooses to default, its debt b is written off but it moves to
financial autarky at the beginning of next period. Denote the value function of a debtor
who has not previously defaulted by Vd(S0, y, b, w).
Vd(S0, y, b, w) = max{W0(y, b, w),W1(y, b, w)}
where W0(y, b, w) is the welfare by choosing D0 and W1(y, b, w) is the welfare by choosing
D1. A debtor makes its default decisions upon the comparison of the two welfare levels
Ds = argmax
s
Ws(y, b, w), s = {0, 1}
More specifically, W0(y, b, w) can be expressed as
W0(y, b, w) = max
Cd,≥0,b′
U(Cd) + βE[Vd(S0, y
′, b′, w′)|y]
subject to
Cd + q(y, b
′, w)b′ ≤ y + b
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Since everything is denominated in debtor country’s domestic good, the debtor’s total
expenditure on consumption is
Cd =
cddpdd + cdcpcc + cdwpdw
pdd
From now on, we normalize pdd to be one and define
pcc
pdd
≡ p. Thus, Cd = cdd + cdcp+ cdw.
We also discipline the level of bonds with the financial constraint following Aiyagari (1994)
b′ ≥ − y¯
r
where r is calibrated to the world interest rate. As long as the debtor does not borrow
b′ > 0, it saves the money in the world financial market at rate qf = 11+r .
Similarly, W1(y, b, bc) the welfare of choosing D1 follows
W1(y, b, w) = max
Cd≥0
U(Cd) + βE[Vd(S1, y
′, 0, w′)|y]
subject to
Cd ≤ y
A country in S1 is in financial autarky, but there is an exogenous probability λ for it
to return to S0 in the next period. Hence, its value function becomes
Vd(S1, y, 0, w) = max
Cd≥0
U(Cd) + β(λE[Vd(S0, y
′, 0, w′)|y] + (1− λ)E[Vd(S1, y′, 0, w)|y]
subject to
Cd ≤ y
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2.3.2.2 Creditor’s Problem
The creditor’s problem is contingent on the debtor’s state. When the creditor deals
with the debtor who hasn’t defaulted in the last period, its value function is
Vc(S0, y, b, w) = max
Cc,b′c≥0,τ0
U(Cc) + βE[pi00(y, b
′, w)Vc(S0, y′, b′, w′)|y
+pi01(y, b
′, w)Vc(S1, y′, b′, w′)|y]
subject to
Cc − q(a, b
′, w)b′
p
+ qfb
′
c ≤ yc −
b
p
+ bc
where
Cc =
cccp+ τcdccd + ccwp
p
pimn(y, b
′, w′) represents the debtor’s probability of going to state Sn from state Sm con-
ditional on y. There is a cutoff income value y∗ of the debtor below which it will default.
Thus, we have
pi00(y, b
′, w) = Pr(y′ > y∗|y) =
y¯∫
y∗
f(y′|y)dy′ = 1− pi01(y, b′, w)
If the debtor is in the default state, the creditor’s value function Vc(S1, y, b, w) is
Vc(S1, y, b, w) = max
Cc,b′c≥0,τ1
U(Cc) + βE[λVc(S0, y
′, 0, w′)|y + (1− λ)Vc(S1, y′, 0, w′)|y]
subject to the budget constraint
Cc + qfb
′
c ≤ yc + bc
The creditor’s financial wealth is its aggregate holding of the two bonds. Since there is
possibility of default, we need to multiply risky asset by the debtor’s repayment decision
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D ∈ {1, 0} where D = 1 represents the repayment case and D = 0 represents the default
case.
w = D(−b) + bc
2.3.2.3 Bond Price
The creditor can choose between two assets: a risky asset and a risk free asset. The
former is the bilateral bond at price q. The latter is the bond purchased from the world
financial market at qf =
1
1+r
. If the debtor is in the default state, the creditor’s saving
which is the difference between its income and consumption is used solely to purchase
risk-free asset bc. If the debtor has good credit history, the creditor’s saving is divided
between b and bc. In this case, the bilateral bond price can be determined by the creditor’s
Euler equation
q
∂Vc
∂Cc
= βE
∂V ′c
∂C ′c
The right hand side is the expected marginal utility from tomorrow’s consumption, which
incorporates the default probability of the debtor. As is pointed out by Lizarazo (2013),
the bond price is higher in the case where creditors are risk-averse due to the fact that
there is covariance between creditors’ consumption and debtors’ default decisions.
2.3.2.4 Goods Price
p denotes the creditor’s goods price pcc relative to the debtor’s goods price pdd. Based
on the creditor’s budget constraint,
cccp+ τcdccd + ccwp
p
− q(a, b
′, w)b′
p
+ qfb
′
c = yc −
b
p
+ bc
we find p is determined jointly by debt b, wealth w and trade cost τ . In the model, the
creditor chooses optimal wealth and trade costs to maximize its utility. In this process,
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it is considering the gains from both the lending channel and the trade channel. This
explains why τ may deviate from its value when the two countries do not borrow and
lend to each other. The debtor anticipates the lower trade cost and strategically makes
its default decisions. This mechanism can be used to explain why both debt levels and
default probabilities are higher than expected.
2.3.2.5 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
We now proceed to define the equilibrium of the model.
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium consists of the debtor’s value function Vd(S,X), the
creditor’s value function Vc(S,X), bond holdings b
′, b′c, consumption choices Cc, Cd, de-
fault decisions D, trade costs τ , bond pricing schedules q(y, b′, w), and relative goods
prices p, such that
1. Given the bond prices q, goods prices p, trade costs τcd, the creditor’s wealth w
and consumption Cc, the debtor chooses optimal Cd, D and b
′ to maximize its expected
lifetime utility.
2. Given the debtor’s default decisions D, bond holdings b′ and consumption Cd, the
creditor chooses optimal τcd, bc and Cc to maximize its expected lifetime utility.
3. Bond markets clear at q and goods markets clear at p.
2.4 Computation
In this two-country model, the creditor and the debtor decide interactively their policy
rules. The numerical solution to the model is found over the space of three state variables,
b the bilateral bond,w the creditor’s wealth and y the debtor’s income.
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We first divide all the three state variables into grids and compute the initial value
function at each grid based on different default states. Second, we derive interactively the
optimal choice of bond holding of both countries and the creditor’s optimal trade cost τ .
In this process, we approximate the value function by cubic spline interpolation, which is
significantly more efficient and accurate than the discrete state space technique which is
commonly used for the computation of sovereign default problems, as is pointed out by
Hatchondo et al. (2010). After we find optimal policy functions, we solve for the debtor’s
default decision and update its value function. We continue the iterating process until the
difference between value functions in consecutive iterations is smaller than the precision
criterion. The algorithm is described in detail below.
2.4.1 Algorithm
Step 1. Discretize b, w, y and compute the corresponding consumption of the debtor at
all the grid nodes. In different default states S0, S1, calculate the utility from consumption
V 00 , V
0
1 . The initial value guess is the higher of the two V
0 = max{V 00 , V 01 }.
Step 2. In default state S1, solve for the creditor’s optimal choice of tariff τ1 and
bond holding bc. With τ1, calculate the price level that clears the goods market and the
resulting debtor’s value function V 11 .
Step 3. In repayment state S0, guess an initial value of tariff τ
0
0 and calculate the
corresponding price level.
Step 4. Given the creditor’s choice, solve the debtor’s problem to get the optimal
borrowing in the next period b′, with which to update the best responding bond holding
b′c and τ
1
0 by maximizing the value function of the creditor.
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Step 5. Continue the iterating process until τ0 converges, at which time compute the
debtor’s interpolated value function V 10 .
Step 6. Compare the debtor’s value function V 10 , V
1
1 , and find the maximum V
1 =
max{V 10 , V 11 }.
Step 7. Repeat Step 2 - Step 6, until value function converges, |V i+1 − V i| ≤ v.
2.4.2 Calibration
Parameters in the model are chosen in our best effort to match either stylized facts
or classical literature on the topic. The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is set to 2.
Discount factor β is set to be relatively low as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) to speed up
convergence of solution and to get a reasonable prediction of default occurrence. We set
the elasticity of substitution between goods ρ to be 2 and the weight of domestic/partner’s
goods in consumption is θh = θf = .3 in the benchmark case. These two parameters are
important in reflecting the relative significance of bilateral trade. We will do a numerical
exercise by looking at value functions and default decisions when varying the values of
ρ. Also following Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), we assume income in the debtor country
follows an AR(1) process with coefficient of autocorrelation ρy = .9 and standard deviation
3.4%. The advantage of choosing the parameter values in a classic paper is that we can
directly compare our results, and highlight the contribution our model — which is the
trade channel — to the existing literature. To this end, we also temporarily set bc = 0
and focus on bilateral lending. To start with, we assume the endowment of the creditor
is twice that of the debtor A¯ = log2. The relative economy size also comes into play in
affecting the creditor’s willingness to adjust trade costs and forgive debt.
All the parameter values are summarized in Table 3.
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Parameter Description Value
β quarterly discount factor 0.80
σ coefficient of relative risk aversion 2
r international risk-free rate 0.01
λ probability autarky ends 0.1
Income process
ρy coefficient of autocorrelation in endowment of debtor 0.9
σy standard deviation of endowment shocks of debtor 0.034
y¯ average endowment level of debtor .00058
A¯ constant endowment level of creditor log2
In the benchmark case
θ weight of home/partner’s goods in consumption 0.3
ρ elasticity of substitution between goods 0.75
Table 2.3: Parametrization
Variable Description AG’s result Our result
std(c) consumption volatility 4.37 4.03
std(tb/y) trade-balance volatility .17 2.81
corr(y, c) correlation between income and consumption .99 .79
corr(y, tb) correlation between income and trade-balance -.33 -.10
avg(b/y) average debt ratio .27 .34
d% default probability .02% .48%
Table 2.4: Comparison across Models
2.4.3 Results
2.4.3.1 Comparison with Previous Work
We first compare the performance of our model with that of Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) (AG for short hereafter) in capturing the features of sovereign defaults. We use
150 simulation samples with 500 periods and report statistics in the Table 4. Among all
the statistics, consumption volatility and average debt ratio are similar across models.
Trade-balance volatility is much greater in my model, as the price adjusts based on the
two countries’ endowment as well as creditor’s trade costs. The correlation between in-
come and consumption turns out to be smaller in our model, partly due to the additional
uncertainty from changes in trade costs and goods’ prices. Our trade balance is counter
cyclical, but the value is greater than that in AG since creditors adjust trade costs to boost
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debtors’ exports. Lastly, both the debt level and default probability are much higher in
our model. It implies that trade benefits encourage debtors to take on more debt than
what they can afford to repay.
2.4.3.2 Trade Costs
In this part, we evaluate the adjustments in trade costs. The following two graphs
present the changes in τ in the two default states S0 and S1 given different combinations
of endowment y and debt b.
It is easy to spot the monotonic relationship between τ1 and y. When there is no out-
standing debt in S1, a debtor’s price of exports negatively comoves with its endowment.
As the elasticity of substitution between goods is below unity in the baseline case, the
price adjusts in the same direction as the tariff revenue. Thus it is in the creditor’s interest
to set a high trade cost when the debtor’s endowment is low. Moreover, the optimal tariff
in the default state is independent of initial debt b as the tariff does not affect repayment
probability.
In S0 with outstanding debt (which corresponds to the debt renegotiation stage in da-
ta), the optimal tariff not only covaries with the debtor’s endowment but also the debtor’s
amount of outstanding debt. For a relatively low level of debt, when we control for b, we
find τ0 decreases in the debtor’s endowment y. This fact can be explained by the same
reasoning as in the S1 state: trade policies do not matter for the debtor’s default decision
because it is always in the debtor’s interest to service the debt. Hence, the creditor choos-
es trade costs that will maximize its revenue. We also find in this region that controlling
for the level of y, τ0 first decreases and then increases in initial debt. This is largely due
to the curvature of the interior solution to the goods market clearing condition. We find
interesting jumps in optimal tariffs above a certain debt level. It is within this region
that the debtor is on the brink of defaulting and has non-smooth choices of b′. The shape
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of the surface can be explained by the following reasons. When debt is high, the debtor
has higher probability to default. To avoid the financial loss of sovereign defaults, the
creditor is willing to sacrifice in the trade channel by choosing a lower value of τ . Hence,
the solution to the optimal τ0 plummets in the region. It is worth-noting that the creditor
and the debtor are best responding to each other’s choices. In expectation of lower τ in
S0, the debtor is also willing to take more debt than in an ordinary setting.
Next, let us compare side by side τ0 and τ1 by fixing the initial debt level to a high
Figure 2.3: Optimal Trade Costs in S0 and S1
level and a low level.
In the case where initial debt is equal to zero, τ0 and τ1 are very close in value. τ0
is slightly greater since the debtor is going to borrow from the creditor in the current
period, the loss in wealth caused by lending is partially compensated by the increased
tariff revenue. Once the level of debt goes up, τ0 is going to be significantly lower than
τ1. This is consistent with the main empirically finding of the chapter: when the debtor
is on the brink of defaulting, the creditor has the incentive to lower trade costs in order
to increase the debtor’s repayment probability.
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Figure 2.4: τ under Different Endowment
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter identifies the increase in bilateral trade shares between a creditor and a
debtor when sovereign default happens. The finding runs contrary to the traditional trade
sanction theory. We build a model which incorporates the trade channel in a sovereign
debt problem to account for the phenomenon. The model builds on the strategic interac-
tion between the creditor and the debtor. By solving the model numerically, we are able
to capture counter-cyclical trade balance and high default probability that are closer to
data than other models.
We consider extending our model in the following ways so that it reflects reality better.
First, we can build a production-economy model instead of endowment-economy model.
Many debtors are in need of developed countries’ support for capital goods and invest-
ment. By introducing two sectors (consumption goods and capital goods) into the model,
the two countries will be more dependent on each other. Second, we consider introducing
a partial default state into the model to reflect the renegotiation stage in sovereign de-
faults better. The equilibrium will feature financial haircut, grace period and dynamics
in trade simultaneously. But the extension does come at the cost of a higher level of com-
putation complexity. Lastly, we can relax the assumption of constant creditors’ income,
and study the creditors’ incentives in different economic conditions. To sum up, there is
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much interesting interaction between the trade channel and the borrowing channel. We
hope future research will explore the mechanisms in depth so that we can have a better
understanding of sovereign defaults.
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CHAPTER III
Does Debt Structure Matter? Financial Constraints
and Trade Revisited
This chapter introduces heterogeneous debt structure across firms into the Melitz trade
model to examine the impact of financial constraints on trade patterns. Small firms rely
heavily on bank loans while big firms have access to corporate bonds. I model this as a
nonlinear financial constraint, which places disproportional burden on small firms, which
further limits their production and ability to export. Theoretically, I build a model that
combines financial markets with two types of debt contracts (bank loans and corporate
debt) and Melitz’s trade framework. These types of debt contracts feature different flota-
tion costs, monitoring costs, and flexibility in debt restructuring. Empirically, I find that
the extensive margin effects become more pronounced when we evaluate the impact of
both types of debt on trade.
3.1 Introduction
Trade economists have recently been interested in combining lessons from corporate fi-
nance theory and international trade models to illustrate the impact of financial resources
on global production and exporting patterns. In particular, Manova (2013) builds a
heterogeneous-firm trade model with financial markets. Using it, she provides an em-
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pirical paradigm to quantitatively identify the mechanisms through which financial con-
straints impede trade.
Previous work in this literature abstracts from heterogeneous debt structures across
firms, which are potentially important in order to understand the allocation of financial
resources among firms of heterogeneous productivity. Incorporating this feature is par-
ticularly important if we hope to separate the extensive margin (the selection of firms
into exporting) and intensive margin (firm-level reduction in trade volume) effects in a
Melitz-type heterogeneous-firm model. This chapter addresses this gap in the literature
by providing both empirical and theoretical analyses.
I introduce heterogeneous debt structure into the model to recognize the fact that
larger productive firms have access to corporate bond markets, while smaller firms mostly
rely on bank loans as their main source of financing. This nonlinear credit constraint
over the firm size distribution suggests a disproportional financial burden on small firms,
which further limits their ability to produce and export when competing with big firms.
Consequently, the extensive margin effect will be more pronounced in my model com-
pared to Manova’s (2013) case, where linear financial constraints are assumed. Taking
corporate bonds into consideration is essential also for realism, since bond markets have
become an important form of external financing for exporting giants, which include both
OECD countries and emerging markets like Brazil, China, and Russia.1
Empirically, I extend Manova’s (2013) work by including not only bank credit but al-
so corporate bonds as sources of financial capital that firms use to fund their production
and exports. Using the cross-country data of Beck et al. (1999) on financial structure
and development, I sum bank loans and corporate bonds as shares of GDP to reflect a
country’s overall abundance of external financing resources. Using new measure, I follow
Manova’s (2013) empirical strategy to examine how financial constraints distort trade.
Since a country’s financial conditions disrupt trade differentially across sectors depending
1See table 1 for descriptive data.
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on sectors’ financial vulnerability, the method that exploits the variation in financial de-
velopment across countries and the variation in financing needs across sectors allows me
to establish causality. Employing this identification strategy, I can decompose the effects
of credit constraints into three channels: (i) reductions in output; (ii) the selection of
firms into exporting; and (iii) the firm level reduction in trade volume.
When I compare my case with total corporate debt as the independent variable to
Manova’s (2013) case where the only source of financing is bank credit, I have the follow-
ing findings: First, reductions in output drive less impact. Second, the extensive margin
of trade is more important in my model. For the first result, I find that reductions in
output (or channel (i)) plays a less important role if we consider not only bank loans but
also corporate bonds. To understand this phenomenon, I contend that big firms are the
main issuers of corporate bonds and the major players in export markets. Hence, offering
a country additional bond issuance opportunities will predominantly affect trade above
and beyond domestic production. Thus, channel (i) is less significant than in the case with
bank loans alone. For the second result, I find that the selection of firms into exporting
(or channel (ii)) plays a more important role if we take corporate bonds into consider-
ation. To interpret this fact, I reason that small-to-medium sized firms on the brink of
exporting would have benefitted more from bond issuance, but limited productivity and
capacity prevented them from overcoming the floatation costs in the bond market. Hence,
the extensive margin effect, that is, the selection of firms into exporting, becomes more
pronounced.
Motivated by these empirical findings, I build a theoretical model that incorporates
two types of debt contracts (bank loans and corporate debt) into the Melitz trade frame-
work. The debt contracts feature different flotation costs, monitoring costs and flexibility
in debt restructuring. In the model, heterogeneous firms choose optimal capital structures
to maximize their profits from production and export. Given the analytic results, I find
that the flotation costs in the bond market make bonds a scarce financial resource, which
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will contract a country’s exports through both extensive and intensive margins. Com-
pared to bank loans, corporate bonds exert more extensive-margin than intensive-margin
effects, because big productive firms can overcome the flotation costs to benefit from bond
issuance. These modeling results match my empirical observations.
This chapter contributes to the small but growing literature on the intersection of
trade and finance. Foley and Manova (2014) summarize the literature that brings to-
gether international trade and corporate finance. Besides the pioneering work of Manova
(2013), Feenstra et al. (2014) introduce asymmetric information about firms’ productivi-
ty and exporting status between creditors and entrepreneurs. In another study, Chaney
(2013) breaks the link between firms’ productivity and liquidity, which leads to differ-
ent results than Manova’s (2013). Nevertheless, none of these previous projects focuses
on firm-level heterogeneous debt structures, with Russ and Valderrama (2012) being an
exception. Russ and Valderrama (2012) assesses the impact of financial development on
aggregate productivity by studying the allocation of production between small and big
firms in a closed economy. My work departs from theirs by focusing on how limited fi-
nancial resources shape trade patterns. My model also admits richer features of the debt
market, influenced by work in corporate finance including Crouzet (2014), Bolton and
Freixas (2000), and Rajan (1992).
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical
findings. Section 3 describes and solves the model. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
In this part, I empirically examine the effect of various financial resources on trade.
Productive firms of greater size can tap into the corporate bond market while small firms
have to mainly rely on bank loans. This distinction between big and small firms is impor-
tant to quantify the mechanisms through which financial constraints impede trade. The
67
empirical analysis corroborates this argument. The results are significantly different from
those in Manova (2013), where bank loans are considered as the only form of external
financing.
Manova (2013) provides a framework to examine the effect of credit constraints on
trade. She introduces financial frictions into a heterogeneous-firm model, and tests the
model implications using aggregate trade data from a large panel of countries and sectors.
Nevertheless, she does not distinguish different forms of external financing and hence ab-
stracts from heterogeneous debt structures across firms, which is potentially important
in accurately identifying extensive and intensive margin effects in a heterogeneous-firm
model. I apply and extend her analysis by taking both bank loans and market bonds into
account.
In the spirit of Manova (2013), I establish causality by exploiting the variation in
financial vulnerability across sectors and the variation in financial development across
countries. This method is based on the idea that a country’s financial conditions disrupt
trade differentially across sectors depending on sectors’ financial vulnerability. Since dif-
ferentials correct for systematic biases at sectoral levels, this method avoids the potential
pitfall of reverse causality and omitted variables.
To ensure consistency when making comparison, I choose the same data sources and
definitions as Manova (2013) for the empirical analysis. For instance, a sector’s depen-
dence on external finance is measured as the share of capital expenditures not financed
with cash flows from operations, which is calculated with the median company’s data
from Compustat (US). Using the same dataset, one can calculate sectors’ asset tangibility
measured by the share of net property, plant and equipment in total book-value assets. In
terms of countries’ financial development, I obtain the ratio of private bond market capi-
talization to GDP from Beck et al. (1999), who also provide information on bank credit,
which is used in Manova’s (2013) paper. Data on bilateral trade flows for 107 countries
and 27 sectors in 1985-1995 at the 4-digit SITC Rev.2 sectoral level are obtained from
68
Feenstra’s World Trade Database. UNIDO provides information on output and number of
establishments by sector. The sources for other variables including GDP, distance, factor
endowment and institutional features are described in Section 5 of Manova (2013).
Table C summarizes the amount of financial resources as shares of GDP in 149 coun-
tries. From the table, we find that bank credit is a more important source of external
financing than corporate bonds on average across all the countries. The ratio of bank
loans to GDP is .32 times on average while that of corporate bonds is merely .06. The
correlation between the two measures, .54, is relatively high, meaning a country with
abundant bank credit also tends to issue more bonds. Only 37 countries have active
corporate bond markets; while most of them are OECD countries, we do find emerging
markets on the list as well. Nevertheless, most firms in developing countries do not use
corporate bonds and their only source of corporate debt financing is bank credit.
Manova (2013) uses credit by banks and other financial intermediaries to the private
sector to measure a country’s financial development. I will instead use the sum of bank
loans and private bond market capitalization (labeled total debt in the table) in the re-
gressions, and compare the results with those in Manova (2013). I expect the results
to be significantly different than those in the case with bank loans only, since corporate
bonds are important sources of external financing for not only most developed countries
but also emerging markets including Brazil, China, and Russia. I prefer total debt to cor-
porate bonds as the independent variable since firms may have country- or sector-specific
strategic concerns when choosing their corporate debt structures. For this reason, the
total amount of debt is a less ambiguous measure of financial resource availability.
There are three channels through which financial market imperfections affect trade:
(i) the reduction in domestic production (ii) the selection of firms into exporting and
(iii) the firm level reduction in trade volume. To disentangle (i) from others, we run the
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following two regressions:
ln(Tijst) = β0 + β1Xjt + β2Xjt × FinDepst + β3Xjt × Tangst
+ β4ln(GDPit) + β5ln(GDPjt) + β6ln(Distij) + β7Pist + FE + ijst (3.1)
ln(Tijst) = β0 + β1Xjt + β2Xjt × FinDepst + β3Xjt × Tangst + β4ln(Estbjst)
+ β5ln(GDPit) + β6ln(GDPjt) + β7ln(Distij) + β8Pist + FE + ijst (3.2)
where Tijst is the bilateral trade volume from country j to country i in sector s at time t.
Xjt is the exporting country’s level of financial development, which is measured either as
bank loans or total debt (the sum of bank loans and private bond market capitalization),
both are measured as shares in GDP. FinDeps and Tangs are the dependence on exter-
nal finance and tangibility of sector s. GDPi and GDPj are importer’s and exporter’s
GDPs while Distij is the distance between the two countries. Estbjs is the number of
establishments, controlling for which we can disentangle the effect of financial constraints
on trade from that on overall production. Moreover, we need to add Pist — importer’s
price level in sector s— proxied by the country’s CPI and its interaction with sector fixed
effects. FE captures various configurations of fixed effects including exporter, importer,
year and sector fixed effects. Lastly, all the standard errors are clustered at country pairs.
Table 3.2 reports the coefficients of regression (1) and (2) where financial development is
measured by the availability of bank loans and total debt respectively.
The first two columns in Table 3.2 report the effect of bank loans on trade before
and after controlling for the selection into domestic production. In both columns, the
regressor ‘bank loans’ by itself has a positive effect on sectoral trade volumes. But in
this difference-in-difference approach, the coefficients on the interactions of a country’s
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Table 3.1: Financial Constraints Trade vs. Production
Fin Devt Def as Bank Loans Total Debt
Total Effect Controlling for Total Effect Controlling for
Domestic Production Domestic Production
Fin Devt 0.167 0.225 0.181 0.044
( 6.23 ) *** ( 3.64 ) *** ( 5.21 ) *** ( 1.04 )
Fin Devt × Fin Dep 1.752 1.343 1.352 1.080
( 113.80 ) *** ( 29.01 ) *** ( 44.51 ) *** ( 29.57 ) ***
[ 0.134 ] [ 0.102 ] [ 0.120 ] [ 0.096 ]
Fin Devt × Tang -2.624 -2.204 -2.015 -1.689
( -65.48 ) *** ( -16.64 ) *** ( -25.38 ) *** ( -16.32 ) ***
(log) Num Establish 0.321 0.318
( 39.89 ) *** ( 39.42 ) ***
pis 0.008 0.008
( 6.86 ) *** ( 7.02 ) ***
LGDPE 0.957 1.071 0.938 1.053
( 36.96 ) *** ( 16.05 ) *** ( 16.32 ) *** ( 15.69 ) ***
LGDPI 0.949 1.040 0.953 1.045
( 41.38 ) *** ( 16.36 ) *** ( 16.56 ) *** ( 16.38 ) ***
LDIST -1.374 -1.418 -1.374 -1.418
( -489.30 ) *** ( -70.27 ) *** ( -79.03 ) *** ( -70.29 ) ***
R-squared 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58
Num observations 861380 579485 861,380 579,485
Note: T-statistics in parentheses and standardized coefficients in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **sig-
nificant at 5%, *significant at 10%. The dependent variable is bilateral trade at the sectoral level. The
independent variables include exporter’s financial development, its interaction with sectoral dependence
on external finance and tangibility, importer’s and exporter’s GDPs, the distance between the two coun-
tries, the number of establishments in a sector, importer’s CPI and its interaction with sector fixed effects,
fixed effects including exporter, importer, year and sector effects. All the standard errors are clustered
at country pairs. The table reports coefficients in the cases before and after controlling for domestic
production.
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financial development and a sector’s financial vulnerability are of greater importance to
quantify causality. Since the coefficients on Fin devt × Fin Dep are positive, we can
establish that financial constraints interfere with trade activity, and this effect is more
pronounced in sectors with greater dependence on external finance. For instance, given
a sector’s financing need, if a country’s financial development measured by the ratio of
bank credit to GDP increases by 1 standard deviation, sectoral trade will increase by .134
standard deviations. If instead financial development is proxied by the ratio of total debt
to GDP, sectoral trade will increase by .12 standard deviations. Moreover, the coefficients
in the regressions enables us to isolate the effect of financial constraints on exports. After
conditioning on the number of establishments and the importers’ sectoral price, we find
the coefficient on Fin devt × Fin Dep falls from 1.752 in Column 1 to 1.343 in column 2.
This result indicates that 1 − 1.343/1.752 = 23.34% of the impact of limited bank loans
on trade is driven by the reduction in output. The second two columns report the effect
of total debt. The signs of coefficients are the same as those in the first two columns with
bank loans as the explanatory variable, meaning including corporate debt does not alter
the direction in which financial resources influence trade. When we divide the coefficients
of Fin devt × Fin Dep in these two columns, we find that 17.29% of the impact of limited
corporate debt on trade is driven by reductions in total output. This number is smaller
than that in the case of bank loans (23.34%), which is consistent with our hypothesis:
since big productive firms are the main issuers of corporate bonds as well as the major
players in export markets, increasing their bond issuance opportunities will mainly help
them in increasing the trade volumes. On the other hand, small firms are more focused
on domestic production and heavily reliant on bank loans. So an additional unit of bank
loans will exert greater effect on domestic production than on trade compared to the case
of total corporate debt.
In the next step, I further decompose the effect of financial market imperfections on
trade into (ii) extensive margin effects (selection of firms into exporting) and (iii) inten-
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Table 3.2: Financial Constraints Extensive Margin vs. Intensive Margin
Fin Devt Def as Bank Loans Total Debt
OLS Ctrl for Selection OLS Ctrl for Selection
into Exporting into Exporting
Fin Devt -0.019 0.578 -0.109 0.011
( -0.24 ) ( 0.71 ) ( -2.00 ) ** ( 0.18 )
Fin Devt × Fin Dep 1.101 0.209 0.932 0.220
( 15.38 ) *** ( 1.46 ) ( 18.29 ) *** ( 1.93 ) *
[ 0.084 ] [ 0.016 ] [ 0.083 ] [ 0.020 ]
Fin Devt × Tang -1.334 -0.649 -1.405 -0.816
( -6.64 ) *** ( -2.83 ) *** ( -10.50 ) *** ( -4.87 ) ***
(log) Num Establish 0.314 0.305 0.310 0.303
( 33.00 ) *** ( 31.54 ) *** ( 32.85 ) *** ( 31.38 ) ***
zijs 1.086 1.087
( 5.99 ) *** ( 6.01 ) ***
z2ijs 0.102 0.105
( 3.80 ) *** ( 3.94 ) ***
z3ijs -0.022 -0.022
( -10.81 ) *** ( -11.14 ) ***
ηijs 1.397 1.385
( 6.40 ) *** ( 6.37 ) ***
LDIST -1.427 -0.619 -1.428 -0.611
( -57.95 ) *** ( -4.56 ) *** ( -58.05 ) *** ( -4.50 ) ***
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.62
Num observations 428444 398726 428,444 398,726
Note: T-statistics in parentheses and standardized coefficients in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **sig-
nificant at 5%, *significant at 10%. The dependent variable is bilateral trade at the sectoral level. The
independent variables include exporter’s financial development, its interaction with sectoral dependence
on external finance and tangibility, importer’s and exporter’s GDPs, the distance between the two coun-
tries, the number of establishments in a sector, importer’s CPI and its interaction with sector fixed effects,
fixed effects including exporter, importer, year and sector effects, and lastly the polynomials of probabil-
ity as well as the inverse Mills ratio in the first-step Probit model. All the standard errors are clustered
at country pairs. The table reports coefficients in the cases before and after controlling for selection into
export.
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sive margin effects (firm level reduction in trade volume). First, I use a Probit model to
study the effects of financial resources on the existence of bilateral trade in a particular
sector:
ln(Dijst) = β0 + β1Xjt + β2Xjt × FinDepst + β3Xjt × Tangst
+β4ln(GDPit)+β5ln(GDPjt)+β6ln(Distij)+β7Pist+Costsij +FE+OtherV arijt+ijst
(3.3)
where Dist is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if country j exports to i in
sector s at time t. Costsij are various measures of bilateral trade entry costs Manova
(2013) considers including the number of days, the number of procedures, and the mone-
tary cost to an entrepreneur of legally starting a business (normalized by GDP per capita);
OtherV arijt are factor endowments, institutions, GDP per capita, and their interactions.
All the other independent variables are the same as those in Equation 1 and 2.
After running the Probit model and getting the predicted probability of export-
ing ρˆijst, we calculate the latent variable zˆijst = Φ
−1(ρˆijst) and the inverse Mills ratio
ηˆijs = φ(zˆijs)/Φ(zˆijs). The inverse Mills ratio is used for Heckman correction for unob-
served heterogeneity. Moreover, I follow Manova (2013) in including a cubic polynomial
of zˆijst to control for selection when isolating the effect on firm level trade volume. The
second-step regression is
ln(Tijst) = β0 + β1Xjt + β2Xjt × FinDepst + β3Xjt × Tangst
+β4ln(GDPit) + β5ln(GDPjt) + β6ln(Distij) + β7Pist + β8ηijst
+
3∑
k=1
βk+8z
k
ijst + Costsij + FE +OtherV arijt + ijst (3.4)
Table 3.2 presents the regression results. Column 1 and 3 list the coefficient estimates
without the correction for selection effects, while Column 2 and 4 represent the case where
we control for selection by including zˆijst and its polynomials as well as ηˆijs as independent
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variables. Comparing the first two columns with the second two, we find bank loans and
total debt show the same coefficient signs of coefficient estimates for the interaction terms,
indicating that they play similar roles: the availability of external financing increases ex-
ports, especially in the sectors with greater financial dependence and less tangibility.
If we divide the coefficient of Fin devt × Fin Dep when we control for selection by
that in the OLS case, we can disentangle extensive-margin from overall effects. In the
case of bank loans, we find .209/1.101 = 18.96% of the effect of financial constraints on
trade lies in firms’ limited entry into exporting2, while the other 81.04% reflects reduc-
tions in firm-level exports. In the case of total corporate debt, 23.63% is limited entry and
76.37% is contractions in firm-level exports. Consequently, we can conclude that extensive
margin effects are stronger when we take heterogeneous debt structures into considera-
tion. To elucidate this result, I reason that small firms’ limited capacity prohibits them
from gaining access to corporate bonds. This limited financing in turn exacerbates their
disadvantage when competing with big firms in gaining momentum to export. In oth-
er words, heterogeneous debt structures place disproportional financial burdens on small
firms, which further limits their ability to export. This accounts for why extensive margin
effects are more pronounced in the case with multiple debt instruments.
To conclude, Table 3.2 summarizes the results in this section. There are two major
findings in the empirical analysis if we consider corporate bonds in addition to bank loans
when examining the effect of financial market imperfections on trade. First, reductions in
output drive less impact. Second, more of the effect lies in the extensive margin of trade
relative to the intensive margin. These new empirical findings call for a theoretical model
that embeds corporate debt choices in the Melitz trade model, which I turn to in the next
section.
2The number is smaller than that in Manova (2013)’s paper, since our independent variables in the
regressions can be slightly different. She unfortunately does not specify and report the OLS regression
in the paper, which makes replication a bit difficult.
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Table 3.3: Decomposing Channels Financial Constraints Affect Trade (in % )
Bank Loans Total Debt
Reduction in production 23.34 17.29
Selection of firms into exporting 14.53 19.54
Firm level reduction in trade volume 62.13 63.17
3.3 Model
The purpose of this model is to capture heterogeneous debt structures across firms:
small firms heavily rely on bank loans while big firms have access to corporate bonds.
I use the Melitz model to argue that financial constraints place disproportional burden
on small firms, which further limits their production and exports. Consequently, the
extensive margin of trade becomes more important relative to the intensive margin when
we add heterogeneous debt structures into the analysis of how financial constraints impede
trade.
The setup of the model is as follows. Households in country i have Cobb-Douglas utility
over their consumption in different sectors Ui = ΠkQ
θk
ik with sectoral weights θk ∈ (0, 1)
and
∑
k θk = 1. In each sector k, consumption composite Qik is a CES bundle of different
varieties qik(ω) with elasticity of substitution 
Qik = [
1∫
0
qik(ω)
−1
 d(ω)]

−1
Under the CES specification, country i’s expenditure on product ω is a function of its
total expenditure Xi:
xik(ω) = Xiθk(
pik(ω)
Pik
)1−
where Pik is the sectoral price Pik = [
∫ 1
0
pik(ω)
1−µ(ω)dj]
1
1− .
Productivity 1/aik(ω) is drawn after a firm pays sunk cost fEcis from a distribution
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F (a) with lower and upper bounds [1/aH , 1/aL]. The firm sets its price pik(ω) and quantity
qik(ω) given cost cik(ω) and productivity 1/aik to maximize its profit. Let its revenue in
market x ∈ {d, f} (d for domestic and f for foreign) be piikx(ω) = pikx(ω) qikx(ω) −
τxcik(ω)aik(ω)qikx(ω). Its optimal price is given by
pikx(ω) =

− 1τxcik(ω)aik(ω)
where τx, x ∈ {d, f} denotes the iceberg trade cost, τd = 1, τf = τ > 1. It is easy to see
that a firm’s revenue increases in its productivity: ∂piikx(ω)
∂1/aik(ω)
> 0. In addition, the firm
needs to fund fixed cost of entering a market fx, x ∈ {d, f} with both internal funding
and external wealth through borrowing. Sectors are different in external financing needs,
measured by tk, which is the proportion of the cost covered by external borrowing of a
sector.
There are two forms of external borrowing — bank loans and corporate bonds. They
are different in three aspects. First, issuing corporate bonds entails higher flotation costs,
reflecting greater transaction barriers such as legal fees and registration fees. Second,
bank loans are flexible in the sense that banks can renegotiate terms with firms in case
of financial distress. This feature helps explain the coexistence of the two debt contracts
for big companies. Third, creditors’ cost of holding bank loans is higher than that of
holding corporate bonds because banks incur higher monitoring cost. This opportunity
cost translates to the higher variable cost of bank loans compared to corporate bonds.
These modeling features are standard in the corporate finance literature. For instance,
Rajan (1992) discusses the benefits and costs of bank financing in providing flexible finan-
cial arrangements. Meanwhile, Diamond (1991) examines and compares the monitoring
decisions of different types of lenders. Lastly, empirical studies like Denis and Mihov
(2003) and Krishnaswami et al. (1999) support the existence of flotation costs of public
debt. I combine all these important distinctions between bank loans and market bonds
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when I set up the debt market.
In the model, there is an exogenous probability ρ for a firm to be in financial stress
where it is forced to be fully or partially liquidated. If distress does not happen, the firm
retains its revenue net of financial repayment
max
s
piikx(ω)−mikx(ω)− bikx(ω)−Gi(s(ω))tkfxcik(ω)
s is the share of corporate bonds in external finance and 1 − s is the share of bank
loans. Gi(s) captures the additional per-unit flotation costs of market bonds in country
i. Gi(0) = 0 for s = 0, meaning the firm doesn’t incur the cost if it does not use bonds.
For s > 0, Gi(s) = gi + g(s). gi is a constant positive number, reflecting the fixed cost
of issuing bonds like registration fees in country i. g(s) is assumed to be a continuously
differentiable function that captures bonds’ variable cost, whose second order derivative
is positive g′′(s) > 0; the convex function reflects diminishing returns to using corporate
bonds.
If instead the firm liquidates when financial distress happens, the firm gets a share of
the liquidation value χL, χ ∈ (0, 1), with the rest going to the creditors based on their
funding shares (1− s)(1−χ)L and s(1−χ)L.3 I further assume a firm’s liquidation value
is proportional to its revenue L = γpi, γ ∈ (0, 1).
Alternatively, firms can renegotiate their debt with creditors to avoid loss from full
liquidation. Yet, corporate bonds are not flexible, so firms partially liquidate debt with
bond holders, who get s(1− χ)L. This in turn affects the final revenue of the firm: pi(ω)
falls to ηpi(ω), η ∈ (0, 1). γ is smaller than η in value because full liquidation involves
greater revenue loss. This assumption also ensures that the surplus from renegotiation is
positive, regardless of the value of s. On the other hand, the debt contract between the
3Some other studies have different assumptions about priority structures for firms to allocate claims
to multiple types of lenders during liquidation. For instance, Rajan (1992) and Crouzet (2014) discuss
the case with bank debt seniority. Nevertheless, it is typically difficult to obtain closed-form solutions
under such structures.
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bank and the firm is renegotiated provided the surplus φ to both parties is positive. φ
will be divided by the bargaining power µ and 1 − µ, µ ∈ (0, 1). The firm gets µφ from
renegotiation and the bank gets (1− µ)φ, where φ takes the form of
φ = ηpi − [χL+ (1− s)(1− χ)L] = [η + (s− 1− sχ)γ]pi
Suppose lenders’ per-unit opportunity cost is denoted as ri, i ∈ {b,m}, which is ex-
ogenously pinned down by macroeconomic conditions and creditors’ monitoring efforts.
Due to the higher monitoring costs, banks charge a higher rate on their loans rb > rm.
This modeling feature that there exists a wedge between the two debt rates is consistent
with both empirical evidence and theoretical studies, including Rauh and Sufi (2010) and
Houston and James (1996).
Based on the information above, we can write down the participation constraints of
all the agents in the model. I assume both borrowers and lenders are risk neutral, and
the supply of funds is perfectly competitive. Creditors’ return should at least cover the
opportunity cost of lending
ρ(1− χ)sL+ (1− ρ)m ≥ stfc(1 + rm)
ρ[(1− χ)(1− s)L+ (1− µ)φ] + (1− ρ)b ≥ (1− s)tfc(1 + rb)
Since the debt market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, the two participation
constraints bind, allowing us to back out the expression of debt repayment
m =
stfc(1 + rm)− ρ(1− χ)sL
1− ρ , b =
(1− s)tfc(1 + rb)− ρ(1− χ)(1− s)L− ρ(1− µ)φ
1− ρ
Using this expression of debt repayment, we rewrite firm’s problem as
max
s,p,q
(1− ρ)(pi −m− b) + ρ(χL+ µφ)−G(s)tfc
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For simplicity, I assume a firm’s debt structure does not affect its variable production
cost c in the baseline case. Given the firm’s problem, the optimal value of s (denoted as
s∗) satisfies
piργ(1− χ) + tfc(rb − rm) = g′(s∗)tfc
From this expression, we find s∗ increases in a firm’s revenue under its optimal price
and quantity pi. This finding suggests that big productive firms use more corporate bonds,
which is consistent with empirical observation. Moreover, the expression yields the fol-
lowing comparative statics about s∗. s∗ increases in the spread between rb and rm. When
bank loans become relatively more expensive, firms are more likely to resort to corporate
bonds, the cheaper source of funding. The higher flotation costs are overshadowed in im-
portance by the variable cost spread. Second, s∗ increases in γ. When the full liquidation
value increases, firms’ benefit from renegotiation decreases. As a result, firms are more
tempted to use corporate bonds.
Next, we find the cutoff revenue for a firm to enter the domestic and foreign goods
market. This cutoff will help us analyze the extensive versus intensive margin effects
under heterogeneous debt structures across firms. As previously described, a financially-
unconstrained firm’s optimal price and quantity are
pik(ω) =

− 1τxcik(ω)aik(ω), qik(ω) =
xik
P 1−ik
[

− 1τxcik(ω)aik(ω)]
−
The cutoff revenue of a firm to enter a market (denoted as p¯ix) is found when we set
a firm’s revenue under its optimal price and quantity from either the domestic or foreign
market equal to its cost:
(1− ρ)(pix −mx − bx) + ρ(χLx + µφx)−Gi(s)tkfxc = 0
pi,m, b are all subscripted x ∈ {d, f}, indicating debt repayments are different between
domestic and exporting firms depending on their distinct revenues. Similarly, fixed costs
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to enter the domestic or foreign market are denoted as fx, x ∈ {d, f} with fd < ff .
Consequently, the company’s revenue cutoff satisfies
p¯ix = tkfxc
Gi(s) + [1 + rb + (rm − rb)s]
1− ρ+ ηρ+ ργs(1− χ)
Comparative static analysis provides some important insights. First, everything else
equal, the higher fixed cost in the foreign market over that in the domestic market ff > fd
requires that the revenue of the cutoff exporting company should be higher than that of
the cutoff domestic company (p¯if > p¯id), so the Melitz selection effect is observed. Second,
the cutoff revenue increases in both production costs c and financial borrowing costs
rm, rb. The higher the costs, the more earning is required for a firm to break even.
Another important implication of this result is that the cutoff revenue is higher for
countries with greater flotation costs in the bond market: ∂p¯ix
∂Gi
> 0. Since Gi(s) = gi+g(s),
we also have ∂p¯ix
∂gi
> 0 if we assume g(s) is common across countries. This result implies
that if country i’s flotation costs are greater than country j’s for exogenous reasons like
higher legal or registration fees (captured by higher gi), we should expect to see stricter
selection of firms into both production and exporting. Furthermore, ∂
2p¯ix
∂gi∂tk
> 0 indicates
that the selection effect is more pronounced in financially vulnerable sectors (i.e. sectors
that require a higher share of external finance).
On the other hand, we find that the revenue cutoff increases in the spread between
corporate bonds and bank loans: ∂p¯ix
∂(rm−rb) > 0, especially in sectors with greater external
financing needs: ∂
2p¯ix
∂(rm−rb)∂tk > 0. The intuition behind the result is that the benefit of
using corporate bonds diminishes when the spread rises. With less affordable sources of
financing, firms need to be more productive to start producing and exporting.
In the next step, I compare the result above to that in the case where bank loans are
the only source of external financing. In this scenario, if firms liquidate when they are in
financial distress, the firms’ owners still gets χL while banks get (1− χ)L. Alternatively,
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firms can renegotiate with banks and split the new surplus ψ = (η − γ)pi with µ going to
owners and 1− µ going to banks. Banks break even in equilibrium:
(1− ρ)b+ ρ[(1− χ)L+ (1− µ)φ] = tfc(1 + rb)
Using this condition, we can back out the expression of bank repayment:
b =
tfc(1 + rb)− ρpi[(1− χ)γ + (1− µ)(η − γ)]
1− ρ
If we plug this result into the zero profit condition, we obtain the cutoff revenue to enter
a market
p˜ix = tkfxc
1 + rb
1− ρ+ ηρ
When we compare p¯if , the cutoff revenue to export in the case with two forms of
debt, and p˜if , the cutoff revenue in the case with bank loans alone, we find that p˜if > p¯if
as long as gi the flotation costs in country i are sufficiently big. In the case where
gi >
(1+rb)ργ(1−χ)
1−ρ+ρη + (rb − rm), the bond market unambiguously exacerbates the selection
of firms into exporting. This resonates with the empirical finding that extensive margin
effects become more important in accounting for the impact of nonlinear credit constraints
on trade.
So far, I have discussed cases under the assumption that a firm is big enough to issue
corporate bonds (m > 0). I find that stricter access to the bond market in country
i, in terms of higher flotation costs gi, will deter firms from producing and exporting.
A subsequent natural question to ask is what is the effect of gi on small firms that do
not use corporate bonds? A greater value of gi will affect trade volumes by limiting
the capacity of small firms who can potentially benefit from bond issuance. Limiting
capacity involves both prohibiting firms from exporting (extensive margin effects) and
lowering trade levels (intensive margin effects). Under this circumstance, firms may not
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be able to set their first-best prices and quantities as before, and their revenues become
a function of their debt choices s. To quantify intensive margin effects, I define ∆pif as
the difference between export revenue with and without using bonds: ∆pif ≡ pis∗f − pis=0f .
s∗ is firms’ optimal share of corporate bonds in their debt structure; it is the solution to
pifργ(1 − χ) + tkffc(rb − rm) = g′i(s)tkffc. Similarly, I also define ∆φf ≡ φs∗f − φs=0f as
the difference between net profit for firm owners with and without using bonds. Flotation
costs gi affect the intensive margin of trade by limiting the trade volumes of firms with
∆pif > 0 and ∆φf < 0. i.e. firms that would increase export revenues but were limited
by flotation costs to tap into the bond market. The question boils down to a system of
equalities
pis=0f < tkffc
g′(s∗) + (rm − rb)
ργ(1− χ)
gi > {[1− ρ+ ρη + ργ(1− χ)s∗]pis∗f − (1− ρ+ ηρ)pis=0f }
1
tkffc
+ s∗(rb − rm)− g(s∗)
Since productivity is drawn from a bound distribution, there exists a solution to the sys-
tem of inequalities above as long as the flotation costs gi are sufficiently big. In this case,
credit constraints cause reductions in firms’ level of exports. In other words, intensive
margin effects exist.
Extensive margin effects are in the same spirit as the analysis above. Nonlinear fi-
nancial constraints affect small firms who would start exporting if they were given the
chance to use corporate bonds. These companies are characterized by pis
∗
f > 0 > pi
s=0
f and
φs
∗
f < 0. Hence, as long as
pis=0f < 0, g
′(s∗) > rb − rm
gi > [1− ρ+ ρη + ργ(1− χ)s∗]pis∗f
1
tkffc
− s∗(1 + rm)− (1− s∗)(1 + rb)− g(s∗)
for some values of productivity 1/a ∈ [1/aH , 1/aL], we observe additional extensive mar-
gin effects on small firms due to their limited access to the bond market.
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Given this analysis, we can conclude:
1) Flotation costs to enter the bond market make bonds a scarce financial resource, which
will limit a country’s trade volume through both extensive and intensive margins. The
effect is more pronounced in sectors with greater external financing needs.
2) Compared to the case with bank loans alone, a mixed debt market with corporate
bonds and bank credit exerts more extensive margin effects on trade.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduces heterogeneous debt structures to the Melitz trade model and
re-examines how financial constraints interrupt trade activity. I use and extend the cross-
country cross-sector empirical analysis of Manova (2013) to quantify the mechanisms
through which financial constraints impede trade. However, this country-level analysis
is not the most direct way to capture the distinctions between small firms and big firm-
s in terms of their debt structures and trade patterns. Future research with a focus on
firm-level analysis will complement the findings in this chapter. Foley and Manova (2014)
surveys some efforts in this direction, but more work needs to be done to examine whether
and how big firms’ access to bonds gives them additional advantages over small firms when
competing for production and exports.
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APPENDIX A
Appendices for Chapter One
A.1 Tables and Charts
Table A1: Top Twenty U.S. Institutional Investors by Assets
Name Equity Assets ($) Location
The Vanguard Group, Inc. 1,607,502,939,834 PA
BlackRock Fund Advisors 1,216,454,636,413 CA
SSgA Funds Management, Inc. 1,000,113,734,436 MA
Fidelity Management & Research Co. 818,423,292,122 MA
T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. 505,493,540,323 MD
Capital Research & Management Co. 458,524,984,616 CA
Wellington Management Co. LLP 410,550,019,151 MA
Capital Research & Management Co. 405,170,640,206 CA
Northern Trust Investments, Inc. 343,990,576,944 IL
Massachusetts Financial Services Co. 267,025,899,324 MA
JPMorgan Investment Management, Inc. 247,083,106,467 NY
Dimensional Fund Advisors LP 234,054,032,158 TX
BlackRock Advisors LLC 193,125,056,156 NY
Mellon Capital Management Corp. 191,980,125,222 CA
TIAA-CREF Investment Management LLC 187,726,247,974 NY
Geode Capital Management LLC 173,264,747,809 MA
Invesco Advisers, Inc. 170,566,991,974 GA
Columbia Management Investment Advisers LLC 155,105,284,565 MA
Dodge & Cox 153,491,210,142 CA
OppenheimerFunds, Inc. 147,243,417,222 NY
Note: This table lists the name, asset size and location of the top twenty US institutional
investors as of 2014Q3. The data source is Factset/Lionshare.
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Figure A1: Ownership of the US Corporate Equity Market
Note: This figure shows the historical trend for the ownership of the US equity
market since WWII. The data source is Federal Reserve Board St. Louis. From the
figure, institutional investors have replaced households as the main owner of the US
equities.
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Table A2: Correspondence between Factset and Datastream Industries
Factset Code Description ICB Description
2405 2410 Foods: Major Diversified; FOODS Food Producers
2415 Foods: Specialty/Candy; Foods: Meat/Fish/Dairy
2420 2425 Beverages: Non-Alcoholic; Beverages: Alcoholic BEVES Beverages
2430 Tobacco TOBAC Tobacco
2440 Apparel; Footware CLTHG Clothing & Accessories, Footwear
1130 Forest Products FORST Forestry
2230 Pulp & Paper FSTPA Paper
2100 Energy Minerals(gas and oil production, coal) OILGP, COALM Oil & Gas Producers
2205 2210 Chemicals: Major Diversified ; CHMCL Chemicals
2215 Chemicals: Specialty; Chemicals: Agricultural
2305 2310 Pharmaceuticals: Major; PHARM Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolog
2315 Pharmaceuticals: Other; Pharmaceuticals: Generic
1105 Steel STEEL Iron & Steel
1115 1120 Aluminum; Precious Metals; NOFMS Nonferrous Metals
1125 Other Metals/Minerals
1300 Electronic Technology ELTNC Electronics & Electric Equipement
1210 Industrial Machinery IMACH Industrial Machinery
1405 Motor Vehicles AUTMB Automobiles & Parts
1420 Home Furnishings FURNS Furnishings
4700 Utilities(Electric Utilities, Gas Distributors, UTILS Utilities
Water Utilities, Alternative Power Generation)
3115 Engineering & Construction HVYCN Heavy Construction
3500 Retail Trade RTAIL Retail
4615 4620 Trucking ; Railroads TRUCK RAILS Trucking ; Railroads
4625 Marine Shipping MARIN Marine Transportation
4610 Airlines AIRLN Airlines
3435 3440 Restaurants; Hotels/Resorts/Cruiselines RESTS,HOTEL Restaurants & Bars; Hotels
3420 3425 Publishing: Newspapers; PUBLS Publishing
Publishing: Books/Magazines
3405 3410 Broadcasting; Cable/Satellite TV; BRDEN Broadcasting & Entertainment
3415 Media Conglomerates
4900 Telecommunications TELCM Telecommunications
4800 Finance FINAN Financials
4885 Real Estate Development RLEST Real Estate
Note: ICB stands for Dow Jones/FTSE’s Industry Classification Benchmark. FactSet reports its own industry and sector classifications.
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Table A3: Correspondence between My Industry Code and ISIC 4
Industry Name My Code ISIC 4
Food Producers 1 151, 153, 1520, 154
Beverages 2 155
Tobacco 3 1600
Clothing & Accessories, Footwear 4 1810, 1820
Forestry 5 202
Paper 6 210
Oil & Gas Producers,Coal 7 2310, 2320
Chemicals 8 241, 242
Pharmaceuticals 9 2423
Iron & Steel 10 2710
Nonferrous Metals 11 2720
Electronics & Electric Equipement 12 3110, 3190, 3210
Industrial Machinery 13 291, 292
Automobiles & Parts 14 3410, 3420, 3430
Furnishings 15 3610
Trucking ; Railroads 20 3520
Marine Transportation 21 351
Publishing 24 221
Note: ISIC Rev.4. stands for International Standard Industrial Classification of All
Economic Activities, Rev.4.
89
Table A4: Sectoral Home Bias
sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
AU 0.46 0.69 0.86 0.31 0.63 0.93 0.59 0.67 0.93 0.92 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.63 0.83 0.88 0.78 0.91 0.69 0.95 0.26 0.93 0.63 0.65
BA 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.56 0.02 0.38 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.31 -
0.01
0.01 0.10
BD 0.28 0.02 0.08 0.99 0.91
BG 0.02 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.43 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.13
BR 0.68 0.72 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.55 0.81 0.87 0.79 0.85 0.88 0.76 0.72 0.45 0.61 0.99 0.33 0.15 0.42
CA 0.22 0.09 -
0.01
0.40 0.90 0.05 0.82 0.64 0.10 0.04 0.72 0.23 0.58 0.42 0.37 0.60 0.36 0.28 0.87 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.39 0.54
CL 0.53 0.75 0.51 0.96 1.00 -
0.06
0.00 0.49 0.95 0.54 0.80 0.73 0.88 0.69 0.90 1.00 0.98 0.77
CN 0.94 0.93 0.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.70 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.80 0.99 0.89 0.55 1.00 0.65 0.95 0.80 0.64 0.92 0.54
CZ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DK -
0.01
0.31 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.09 -
0.03
0.00 0.42 0.00 0.16 0.34 0.50 0.13 0.13
ES 0.39 0.25 0.99 0.00 0.64 0.08 0.77 0.69 0.82 0.77 0.00 0.74 0.91 0.61 0.61 0.78 0.83 0.66 0.25
FN 0.61 0.32 0.63 0.16 0.02 0.31 0.31 -
0.03
0.06 0.16 -
0.06
0.34 0.35 0.75 0.40 0.70 0.20 -
0.03
0.31 0.34 0.27 0.24 0.40
FR 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.04 -
0.03
0.00 0.50 0.18 0.11 0.01 -
0.01
0.23 0.66 -
0.01
0.23 0.26 0.07 0.28 0.00 0.52 0.06 0.04 0.13
GR 0.15 -
0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.32 0.14 0.36 0.29 0.58 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.13
HK 0.34 0.01 0.19 -
0.04
0.11 0.34 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.24 0.38 0.05 0.48 0.63 0.17 0.11 0.35 0.18 0.11 0.31
HN 0.00 0.61 0.06 0.00 0.58 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.16 0.59 0.00 0.36
IR 0.39 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.23 0.00
IS 0.60 0.91 0.81 0.94 0.46 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.98 0.64 0.90 0.72 0.50 0.44 0.57
IT 0.08 0.07 0.40 0.07 -
0.03
0.02 0.01 -
0.04
0.00 0.02 0.31 0.18 0.47 0.50 0.28 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.38 0.46 0.37 0.08
JP 0.53 0.32 0.14 0.45 0.57 0.09 0.60 0.34 0.65 0.20 0.40 0.78 0.77 0.20 0.35 0.87 0.44 0.77 0.69 0.94 0.39 0.23 -
0.03
0.33 0.25
KO -
0.01
0.00 -
0.02
0.00 0.00 -
0.01
-
0.02
0.00 -
0.09
-
0.01
-
0.05
-
0.04
-
0.04
-
0.01
-
0.01
-
0.06
-
0.01
0.00 -
0.03
-
0.02
0.00 0.00 -
0.02
KW 0.25 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.77
LX 0.00 0.00 -
0.02
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
0.03
0.00
MX 0.99 0.94 0.27 1.00 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.54 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.98
Note: This table lists the sectoral home bias index. The formula of the index is HBi,s=1-Share of Sector s Foreign Equities in Country i
Equity Holdings/Share of sector s Foreign Equities the World Market Portfolio. The data are from Factset/Lionshare and Datastream. The
index covers 26 sectors from 43 countries. There are 834 observations in total, with mean 0.39 and std. dev. 0.36. The histogram is shown
in Figure 1.2.2.
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Table A5: Sectoral Home Bias (Continued)
sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
MY 0.98 0.94 0.86 0.45 0.95 -
0.03
0.13 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.14 1.00 1.00 0.99
NL 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.00 -
0.05
0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.20 0.16 0.01 -
0.02
0.00 0.61 0.00 0.08
NW 0.52 0.19 0.00 0.87 -
0.01
0.19 0.63 0.03 0.31 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.80 0.60 0.66 0.00 0.82 0.51 0.00 0.73 0.82
NZ 0.05 0.31 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01 -
0.01
0.53 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.45 0.09 0.35 0.11
OE 0.17 -
0.01
0.72 0.00 0.44 0.06 0.39 0.14 0.69 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.59
PH 0.95 0.86 0.92 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.62 0.88 0.99 0.55 0.95 0.91 0.73 0.98 0.90 0.82 0.92 0.98 0.95 0.68 0.96
PO 0.00 0.10 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.76 0.56 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.76 0.87 0.63
PT 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.94
QA 1.00 0.87 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.91 0.29 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.55 0.97 1.00
RM 1.00 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.90
RS 0.06 -
0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.40 0.13 0.49 0.13 0.38 0.00 0.09
SA 0.51 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.79 0.66 0.57 0.00 0.52
SD 0.97 0.01 0.90 1.00 0.96 0.82 0.98 0.53 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.86 0.51 1.00 0.20 0.83 0.76
SG 0.34 0.32 -
0.02
0.16 0.67 0.25 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.65 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.77 0.82 0.01 0.75 -
0.01
0.56 0.08 0.49 0.51
SJ 0.08 0.43 0.47 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.57 0.19 0.54 0.91 0.04 0.60 0.00 0.77 0.69 0.61 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.53 0.45
SW 0.26 -
0.17
0.57 0.11 0.00 0.24 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.05 -
0.01
0.02 0.07 0.25 0.30 -
0.01
0.00 0.03 0.04
TA 0.55 0.49 0.00 0.66 0.72 0.86 0.57 0.45 0.28 0.22 0.68 0.60 0.74
UAE 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.85 0.45 0.54
UK 0.26 0.34 0.52 0.27 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.46 0.01 0.08 0.32 0.12 0.19 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.28 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.61 0.62 0.28 0.50
US 0.76 0.67 0.76 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.82 0.73 0.62 0.47 0.29 0.81 0.61 0.47 0.92 0.81 0.65 0.79 -
0.02
0.67 0.48 0.62 0.78 0.40 0.81 0.52
avg 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.65 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.52 0.38 0.44 0.52 0.48 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.44
Note: This table lists the sectoral home bias index. The formula of the index is HBi,s=1-Share of Sector s Foreign Equities in Country i
Equity Holdings/Share of sector s Foreign Equities the World Market Portfolio. The data are from Factset/Lionshare and Datastream. The
index covers 26 sectors from 43 countries. There are 834 observations in total, with mean 0.39 and std. dev. 0.36. The histogram is shown
in Figure 1.2.2.
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Table A6: Country and Sector Codes
Country/Region Code Country/Region Code Sector Code
Australia AU New Zealand NZ Food Producers 1
Austria OE Norway NW Beverages 2
Bahrain BA Philippines PH Tobacco 3
Belgium BG Poland PO Clothing & Accessories, Footwear 4
Brazil BR Portugal PT Forestry 5
Canada CN Qatar QA Paper 6
Chile CL Romania RM Oil & Gas Producers,Coal 7
China CA Russia RS Chemicals 8
Czech Republic CZ Singapore SG Pharmaceuticals 9
Denmark DK South Africa SA Iron & Steel 10
Finland FN Spain ES Nonferrous Metals 11
France FR Sweden SD Electronics & Electric Equipement 12
Germany BD Switzerland SW Industrial Machinery 13
Greece GR Taiwan TA Automobiles & Parts 14
Hong Kong HK U.A.E. AE Furnishings 15
Hungary HN United Kingdom UK Utilities 16
Ireland IR United States US Heavy Construction 17
Israel IS Retail 18
Italy IT Real Estate 19
Japan JP Trucking ; Railroads 20
Korea KO Marine Transportation 21
Kuwait KW Airlines 22
Luxembourg LX Restaurants & Bars; Hotels 23
Malaysia MY Publishing 24
Mexico MX Broadcasting & Entertainment 25
Netherlands NL Telecommunications 26
Note: This table defines the abbreviation of countries and sectors listed in Table A4.
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Table A7: National Home Bias
Australia 0.797 France 0.362 Malaysia 0.984 Russia 0.958
Austria 0.099 Germany 0.209 Mexico 0.939 Singapore 0.124
Bahrain 0.927 Greece 0.354 Netherlands 0.096 Slovenia 0.818
Belgium 0.138 Hong Kong 0.184 New Zealand 0.658 South Africa 0.761
Brazil 0.722 Hungary 0.418 Norway 0.087 Spain 0.410
Canada 0.538 Ireland 0.319 Philippines 0.570 Sweden 0.463
Chile 0.747 Israel 0.896 Poland 0.939 Switzerland 0.158
China 0.954 Italy 0.272 Portugal 0.758 Taiwan 0.773
Czech 0.254 Japan 0.489 Qatar 0.459 United Arab Emirates 0.836
Denmark 0.144 Korea 0.943 Romania 0.998 United Kingdom 0.394
Finland 0.599 Kuwait 0.377 United States 0.724
Note: This table lists the national home bias index. The formula of the index is HBi=1-Share
of Foreign Equities in Country i Equity Holdings/Share of Foreign Equities the World Market
Portfolio. The data are from Factset/Lionshare and Datastream.
Figure A7:
Comparison of Home Bias Constructed with Factset/Lionshare Data and IFS
Data
Note: This figure plots my national home bias index against that in Coeurdacier and Rey
(2013). I use Factset/Lionshare data to construct the index while they use IFS data.
Most of the points are close to the 45 degree line, so the two indices are consistent. Our
datasets do cover different time periods, which may account for much of the discrepancy.
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A.2 Empirical Robustness Checks
A.2.1 Clustering
In this section, I cluster standard errors at country and sector levels. This exercise is
to control for the within-group correlations between observations. In Table A.2.1, we find
the negative correlation between sectoral home bias and sectoral productivity still holds.
Table A8: Sectoral Home Bias and Sectoral Productivity
Dependent Variable: Sectoral Home Bias
Clustered at Country Level ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
TFP -0.038 ** -0.037 ** -0.045 **
( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.021 )
constant 0.472 *** 0.441 *** 0.438 ***
( 0.115 ) ( 0.111 ) ( 0.107 )
Country FE No Yes No
Sector FE No No Yes
Observations 350 350 350
Adj R2 0.043 0.045 0.056
Clustered at Sector Level ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
TFP -0.038 *** -0.037 *** -0.045 ***
( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 )
constant 0.472 *** 0.441 *** 0.438 ***
( 0.053 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.054 )
Country FE No Yes No
Sector FE No No Yes
Observations 350 350 350
Adj R2 0.043 0.045 0.056
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and standardized coefficients in brackets.***significant at
1%, **significant at 5%. The dependent variable is sectoral home bias. The independent variables are
productivity in natural logs. Standard errors are clustered at country and sector levels.
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A.2.2 Intermediate Imports and Outbound FDI
In this section, I do robustness checks by including intermediate imports and out-
bound foreign direct investment as independent variables in the regressions which test
the relationship between sectoral home bias and sectoral productivity.
The data of sectoral intermediate imports are available in the OECD statistics library.
The data of outbound foreign direct investment are available at the International Trade
Centre. The regression results are listed in Table A.2.2.
Table A9: Sectoral Home Bias and Sectoral Productivity
Dep. Var: Sectoral HB ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
TFP -0.038 *** -0.038 *** -0.040 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 )
intermediate imports -0.004 -0.006 -0.007
( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.008 )
constant 0.521 *** 0.474 *** 0.542 ***
( 0.114 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.117 )
Country FE No Yes No
Sector FE No No Yes
Observations 308 308 308
R2 0.045 0.059 0.046
Dep. Var: Sectoral HB ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
TFP -0.082 *** -0.082 *** -0.084 ***
( 0.021 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.022 )
outbound FDI 0.003 0.000 0.003
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
constant 0.697 *** 0.631 *** 0.684 ***
( 0.183 ) ( 0.182 ) ( 0.183 )
Country FE No Yes No
Sector FE No No Yes
Observations 89 89 89
R2 0.145 0.178 0.148
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and standardized coefficients in brackets.***significant at
1%. The dependent variable is sectoral home bias. The independent variables are productivity, imports of
intermediate goods and outbound FDI, all in natural logs. The table reports coefficients in the ordinary
least squares (OLS), country fixed effect, sector fixed effect and country-sector fixed effect models.
Sectoral home bias is negatively correlated with sectoral TFP in all the specifications.
The coefficients of intermediate imports and outbound FDI are not significant, indicating
that these two factors are not important drivers for sectoral home bias. My hypothesis
that sectoral home bias is weaker in more productive sectors still holds.
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A.3 Proofs
A.3.1 Model Log-linearization
In this section, I log-linearize the model around its steady state and evaluate the effect
of sectoral productivity shocks on wages and exchange rates. The answer enables us to
determine the equity portfolio by helping us understand the roles that different assets
play in risk-hedging.
In the benchmark case, I assume the two countries are symmetric for simplification
purposes. Not only do they have the same amount of labor, their within-country relative
productivity and preference over goods are also symmetric. The assumptions make it
easier to derive analytical solutions and allow us to concentrate on the main mechanism
of the model. Many of the assumptions can be relaxed in extended models.
I assume the productivity levels in the steady state are
T¯H,b = T¯F,a = 1, T¯H,a = T¯F,b = T > 1
Since there is no trade cost, goods prices are the same across countries with the law
of one price (LOOP). The price of sector a goods relative to sector b goods follows
s ≡ Pa
Pb
= [
TH,aw
−θ
H + TF,aw
−θ
F
TH,bw
−θ
H + TF,bw
−θ
F
]−
1
θ = [
TH,aw
−θ + TF,a
TH,bw−θ + TF,b
]−
1
θ
Given the CPI-based real exchange rate e = PH
PF
, we can find the link between the
fluctuation in the relative sectoral price s and the variation in the exchange rate e under
the CES utility:
eˆ = (2ψ − 1)sˆ
where xˆ = log xt−x¯
x
is the log-deviation of a variable from its steady state.
Based on Backus and Smith (1993), the changes in the relative marginal utility across
countries are proportional to the changes in the consumption-based real exchange rate as
−σ(CˆH − CˆF ) = eˆ
Hence, the relative price-adjusted aggregate consumption PHCH
PFCF
follows
PˆC = Pˆ + Cˆ = (1− 1
σ
)eˆ = (2ψ − 1)(1− 1
σ
)sˆ
Now let us focus on the the covariance between financial returns. In our model, asset
returns of country i sector s at time t are equal to the sum of dividends and changes in
the price of equities
ri,s,t =
qi,s,t + di,s,t
qi,s,t−1
Coeurdacier et al. (2010) and Coeurdacier (2009) show that a ‘static’ budget constraint
condition is equivalent to a dynamic budget constraint condition (Equation1.1,1.2) up to
a first order approximation. In the static budget constraint with no future variables,
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the prices of equities q disappear and the covariance between financial returns is solely
dependent on the covariance between dividends.
Within a sector, the relative dividend at home versus abroad (ds =
dH,s
dF,s
, s ∈ {a, b}) is
equal to the relative market shares of the two countries in sector s.
dˆs = Tˆs − θwˆ
Within a country, the relative dividend in sector a versus sector b (di =
di,a
di,b
, i ∈ {H,F})
becomes
dˆi = Tˆi + [θ − φ+ 1 + (2ψ − 1)2(φ− 1
σ
)]sˆ
From the expressions, we find the covariances between dividends not only depend on
productivity shifts themselves, but also on their impact on the relative wage and exchange
rate.
Denote the difference between the productivity shocks of the two countries’ productive
sectors as Tˆ1 ≡ TˆH,a− TˆF,b and that of the unproductive sectors as Tˆ2 ≡ TˆH,b− TˆF,a. With
the Eaton-Kortum framework which links goods supply to labor cost, a pair of productiv-
ity shocks (Tˆ1, Tˆ2) is uniquely mapped to a pair of wages and prices changes (wˆ, sˆ). The
relative wage at home is equal to the relative price-adjusted aggregate production, thus
wˆ =
1
1 + θ
{T − 1
T + 1
[1 + θ − φ+ (2ψ − 1)2(φ− 1
σ
)]sˆ+
T
T + 1
Tˆ1 +
1
T + 1
Tˆ2
Moreover, the log-linearization of the relative price yields
sˆ =
T − 1
T + 1
wˆ +
1
θ
1
T + 1
[−T Tˆ1 + Tˆ2]
Hence, sectoral productivity shocks affect relative labor income and real exchange rate
with
sˆ = {(T+1)2(1+θ)−(T−1)2λ}−1{[(T−1)T−θ + 1
θ
(T+1)T ]TˆH,a+[T−1+θ + 1
θ
(T+1)]TˆH,b
+[(T − 1)(−1)− θ + 1
θ
(T + 1)]TˆF,a + [−(T − 1)T + θ + 1
θ
(T + 1)T ]TˆF,b}
wˆ = {(T+1)2(1+θ)−(T−1)2λ}−1{[(T+1)T−λ
θ
(T−1)T ]TˆH,a+[(T+1)−λ
θ
(T−1)(−1)]TˆH,b
+[(T + 1)(−1)− λ
θ
(T − 1)]TˆF,a + [(T + 1)(−T )− λ
θ
(T − 1)(−T )]TˆF,b}
where λ ≡ 1 + θ − φ+ (2ψ − 1)2(φ− 1
σ
).1
There are two parts in each of the coefficients. The first one denotes the direct effect of
sectoral productivity shocks on s or w, and the second denotes the indirect effect induced
by demand changes. For instance, the coefficient of TˆH,a in wˆ consists of T (T + 1) (direct
1Since the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods is above unity (Literature including
Levchenko and Zhang (2011) set it equal to 2), λ < θ always holds.
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effect) and −λT (T−1)
θ
(indirect effect). With the direct effect, the productivity boost raises
the domestic income. With the indirect effect, domestic labor income decreases due to
the lower price of exports. The overall influence of the shock depends on which effect
dominates.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition I.1
The difference between the two countries’ budget constraints follows
1
α
PˆC − 1− α
α
wˆL = [µSa − (1− µ)(1− Sb)]dˆa + [(1− µ)Sb − µ(1− Sa)]dˆb + (2µ− 1)dˆF
χ(x1, x2) is the covariance between x1 and x2. χ
2(x) is the variance of variable x. I
also denote the sum of the covariances of variable xˆ with dˆa, dˆa as
∑
χ(xˆ). When we take
the covariance between dˆs and all the other variables, we find
1
α
(1− 1
σ
)χ(eˆ, dˆa)− 1− α
α
χ(wˆL, dˆa) = [µSa − (1− µ)(1− Sb)]χ2(dˆa)
+ [(1− µ)Sb − µ(1− Sa)]χ(dˆb, dˆa) + (2µ− 1)χ(dˆF , dˆa)
1
α
(1− 1
σ
)χ(eˆ, dˆb)− 1− α
α
χ(wˆL, dˆb) = [µSa − (1− µ)(1− Sb)]χ(dˆa, dˆb)
+ [(1− µ)Sb − µ(1− Sa)]χ2(dˆb) + (2µ− 1)χ(dˆF , dˆb)
⇒ 1
α
(1− 1
σ
)Σχ(eˆ)− 1− α
α
Σχ(wˆL) = (2µ− 1)Σχ(dˆF )
+[µSa − (1− µ)(1− Sb) + (1− µ)Sb − µ(1− Sa)](χ2 + χ(dˆa, dˆb))
Sectoral technological shocks are i.i.d. and countries are symmetric, so the following
equations hold
χ2(dˆa) = χ
2(dˆb) = χ
2, Σχ(dˆF ) = Σχ(dˆH)
Plug them back and rearrange the equation, I obtain the aggregate domestic share as
µSa+(1−µ)Sb = 1
2
+[
σ − 1
2σα
∑
χ(eˆ)−1− α
2α
∑
χ(wˆL)−2µ− 1
2
∑
χ(dˆH)][χ
2+χ(dˆa, dˆb)]
−1
Next, I determine the sign of χ2 + χ(dˆa, dˆb) :
χ2 + χ(dˆa, dˆb) = [(2θT (1−
λT−1
T+1
θ
)− 1]2 + [2θ(1 + λ
T−1
T+1
θ
)− 1]2 > 0
Since it has a positive sign, the coefficient of labor income in Equation 1.5 is negative
and the coefficient of real exchange rate is positive when σ > 1.
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A.3.3 Proof of Proposition I.3
The difference between domestic and foreign budget constraints can be written as
1
α
PˆC − 1− α
α
wˆL = [µSa − (1− µ)(1− Sb)]dˆ1 + [(1− µ)Sb − µ(1− Sa)]dˆ2
where dˆ1 and dˆ2 can represent dˆ1 = dˆH,a − dˆF,b = λs + Tˆ1 − θwˆ, dˆ2 = dˆH,b − dˆF,a =
−λsˆ+ Tˆ2 − θwˆ. Moreover, a pair of (Tˆ1, Tˆ2) is uniquely mapped to a pair of (sˆ, wˆ) via
Tˆ1 =
1
2T
[(1− T )λ− (T + 1)θ]sˆ+ 1
2T
[(1 + θ)(T + 1) + θ(T − 1)]wˆ
Tˆ2 =
1
2
[(T + 1)θ − λ(T − 1)]sˆ+ 1
2
[(1 + θ)(T + 1)− θ(T − 1)]wˆ
Let Ω1 = µSa − (1 − µ)(1 − Sb) and Ω2 = (1 − µ)Sb − µ(1 − Sa). Plug this in the
original budget constraint, and we will get an equation with (sˆ, wˆ) only:
(1− 1
σ
)(2ψ − 1))sˆ = (1− α)wˆ + αΩ1(λsˆ+ Tˆ1 − θwˆ) + αΩ2(−λsˆ+ Tˆ2 − θwˆ)
⇒ (1− 1
σ
)(2ψ−1))sˆ = {1−α−θαΩ1−θαΩ2+αΩ1
2T
[(θ+1)(T+1)+θ(T−1)]+αΩ2
2
[(θ+1)(T+1)
−θ(T − 1)]}wˆ+ {αλΩ1−αλΩ2 + αΩ1
2T
[(1−T )λ− (T + 1)θ] + αΩ2
2T
[(1−T )λ+ (T + 1)θ]}sˆ
Optimal portfolio ensues regardless of the w and s shocks to be realized in the economy.
By matching the coefficients of sˆ and wˆ, we get the expressions of Ω1 and Ω2.
Ω1 ≡ µSa − (1− µ)(1− Sb) = T
T + 1
α− 1
α
+
T
T + 1
1
α
(1− 1
σ
)
λ− θ
Ω2 ≡ (1− µ)Sb − µ(1− Sa) = 1
T + 1
α− 1
α
− 1
T + 1
1
α
(1− 1
σ
)
λ− θ
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A.4 Comparative Statics with σ and ψ
Home Bias and σ
Domestic households buy the domestic unproductive sector’s assets (νH,b > 0) and
sell the domestic productive sector’s assets (νH,a < 0). Home bias in sector a is weaker
than that in sector b. With the increase in the coefficient of risk aversion σ, the two
asset positions gradually converge. The more risk-averse the households are, the greater
tendency they have to smooth consumption by cutting the holdings of risky assets. This
explains why the absolute values of the four equity assets all decrease in σ.
Home Bias and ψ
For most values of ψ, νH,a lies below νH,b. Nevertheless, at the right end of ψ, the
relationship flips and the holdings of fH,a shoot up. When there is less diversification
need in consumption since a domestic agent places dominant weights on a goods, there
is limited risk-hedging role for sector b to play. As a result, sectoral home bias is very
volatile at the tails of ψ.
Figure A9: Comparative Statics: σ Figure A9: Comparative Statics: ψ
Note: This figure presents sectoral home bias under different values of coefficient of risk aversion σ and
weight of productive sectors’ goods in consumption ψ. Parameter values of σ and ψ are on the vertical
axes and equity holdings are on the horizontal axes.
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APPENDIX B
Appendices for Chapter Two
B.1 Tables and Charts
Table A10: IMF Programs
IMF SBA IMF Standby Arrangement agreed
IMF EFF IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangement agreed
IMF SAF IMF Structural Adjustment Facility Arrangement agreed
IMF PRGF IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangement agreed
IMF SBA 5 IMF Standby Arrangement in effect for at least 5 months
in a particular year
IMF EFF 5 IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangement in effect
for at least 5 months in a particular year
IMF SAF 5 IMF Structural Adjustment Facility Arrangement in effect
for at least 5 months in a particular year
IMF PRGF 5 IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangement in effect
for at least 5 months in a particular year
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Table A11: Effect of Debt Renegotiations on Trade Volumes
bilateral bilateral trade 1to2 trade 1to2 trade 2to1 trade 2to1
FE RE FE RE FE RE
paris -0.0115 -0.0114 0.0259 0.0124 -0.0496 -0.0459
(-0.30) (-0.32) -(0.54) (-0.25) (-1.08) (-0.99)
parisl1 -0.0438 -0.0515 -0.0432 -0.0639 -0.102* -0.106*
(-1.14) (-1.32) (-0.89) (-1.30) (-2.19) (-2.25)
parisl2 -0.0358 -0.044 -0.0194 -0.0392 -0.0832 -0.0882
(-0.92) (-1.11) (-0.39) (-0.79) (-1.76) (-1.85)
parisl3 -0.057 -0.0746 -0.0732 -0.103* -0.0705 -0.0861
(-1.45) (-1.87) (-1.48) (-2.05) (-1.48) (-1.79)
parisl4 -0.0376 -0.059 -0.0183 -0.0516 -0.0724 -0.0937
(-0.95) (-1.47) (-0.37) (-1.02) (-1.51) (-1.93)
parisl5 -0.0568 -0.0662 -0.0507 -0.0695 -0.115* -0.125*
(-1.43) (-1.64) (-1.01) (-1.36) (-2.38) (-2.56)
parisl6 0.0226 -0.00173 0.0153 -0.0228 -0.0317 -0.0539
(-0.56) (-0.04) (-0.3) (-0.44) (-0.65) (-1.10)
parisl7 -0.0389 -0.07 -0.0862 -0.134** -0.053 -0.0812
(-0.96) (-1.71) (-1.69) (-2.58) (-1.08) (-1.64)
parisl8 -0.0588 -0.0972* -0.0904 -0.148** -0.0588 -0.094
(-1.44) (-2.35) (-1.76) (-2.85) (-1.19) (-1.88)
parisl9 -0.0794 -0.112** -0.116* -0.167** -0.043 -0.0737
(-1.89) (-2.63) (-2.19) (-3.11) (-0.84) (-1.43)
parisl10 -0.109* -0.144*** -0.156** -0.209*** -0.0897 -0.122*
(-2.55) (-3.32) (-2.89) (-3.82) (-1.73) (-2.33)
parisl11 -0.136** -0.178*** -0.132* -0.192*** -0.168** -0.206***
(-3.10) (-4.00) (-2.39) (-3.43) (-3.17) (-3.84)
parisl12 -0.0615 -0.108* -0.0911 -0.158** -0.0728 -0.115*
(-1.33) (-2.31) (-1.56) (-2.67) (-1.30) (-2.04)
parisl13 -0.0779 -0.130** -0.0963 -0.166** -0.120* -0.169**
(-1.63) (-2.68) (-1.60) (-2.70) (-2.07) (-2.87)
parisl14 -0.125* -0.195*** -0.212*** -0.303*** -0.118* -0.184**
(-2.53) (-3.88) (-3.40) (-4.80) (-1.97) (-3.03)
parisl15 -0.196*** -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.378*** -0.175** -0.251***
(-3.83) (-5.34) (-4.31) (-5.80) (-2.83) (-4.01)
imf -0.128*** -0.155*** -0.201*** -0.233*** -0.144*** -0.170***
(-28.48) (-34.03) (-33.79) (-38.87) (-25.29) (-29.80)
imfl1 -0.0248*** -0.0401*** -0.0366*** -0.0552*** -0.0290*** -0.0432***
(-5.08) (-8.11) (-5.71) (-8.50) (-4.73) (-6.98)
imfl2 -0.00372 -0.0132* -0.000829 -0.0122 0.00468 -0.00298
(-0.72) (-2.53) (-0.12) (-1.79) -0.73 (-0.46)
imfl3 -0.000458 -0.0109* 0.0129 0.000624 0.00785 -0.000803
(-0.09) (-2.00) -1.85 -0.09 -1.18 (-0.12)
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imfl4 0.0281*** 0.0134* 0.0425*** 0.0247*** 0.0239*** 0.0116
(-5.1) (-2.39) (-5.95) (-3.41) (-3.48) (-1.68)
imfl5 0.104*** 0.0720*** 0.147*** 0.109*** 0.125*** 0.0981***
(-19.68) (-13.48) (-21.66) (-15.77) (-19.09) (-14.9)
custrict 0.421*** 0.398*** 0.389*** 0.387*** 0.296*** 0.325***
(-10.54) (-10.33) (-7.43) (-7.68) (-5.88) (-6.7)
ldist 0.255*** -1.334*** 0.0988 -1.556*** 0.515*** -1.438***
(-4.04) (-80.74) (-1.21) (-70.94) (-6.58) (-66.55)
lrgdp 0.332*** 0.543*** 0.216*** 0.528*** 0.487*** 0.676***
(-54.99) (-119.28) (-25.7) (-84.79) (-61.38) (-113.06)
lrgdppc 0.155*** 0.00498 0.357*** 0.102*** 0.0924*** -0.0336***
(-18.36) (-0.79) (-30.63) (-11.97) (-8.41) (-4.10)
comlang -0.0284 0.243*** 0.0850** 0.419*** -0.271*** 0.107***
(-1.27) (-12.56) (-2.81) (-16.05) (-9.51) (-4.33)
border 0.0191 0.976*** 0.0234 0.983*** -0.158 1.177***
(-0.1) (-11.27) (-0.09) (-8.63) (-0.62) (-10.44)
regional 0.295*** 0.275*** 0.291*** 0.264*** 0.321*** 0.312***
(-10.39) (-9.58) (-8.1) (-7.28) (-9.27) (-8.92)
landl 1.158*** -0.559*** 1.202*** -0.623*** 0.689*** -0.658***
(-26.48) (-27.48) (-20.6) (-22.97) (-12.35) (-24.75)
island 0.422*** 0.197*** 0.436*** 0.219*** 0.456*** 0.254***
(-20.25) (-11.84) (-15.76) (-9.9) (-16.89) (-11.74)
lareap 0.496*** 0.172*** 1.419*** 0.259*** 0.531*** 0.149***
(-5.67) (-36.3) (-12.35) (-40.79) (-4.74) (-23.9)
comcol 0.574*** 0.197*** 0.551*** 0.222*** -0.216* 0.195***
(-6.99) (-5.03) (-4.88) (-4.22) (-2.08) (-3.8)
curcol 0.348*** 0.539*** 0.374*** 0.617*** 0.644*** 0.797***
(-4.05) (-6.39) (-3.43) (-5.76) (-6.13) (-7.75)
colony 0.314** 1.408*** 0.327** 1.534*** 0.261* 1.368***
(-3.23) (-18.2) (-2.66) (-15.43) (-2.21) (-14.21)
comctry -0.701*** -1.077*** -0.670*** -1.132*** -0.776*** -1.146***
(-12.23) (-19.33) (-9.24) (-16.06) (-11.11) (-16.93)
cons -18.87*** -6.088*** -37.82*** -7.988*** -28.41*** -11.06***
(-8.99) (-33.77) (-13.72) (-33.16) (-10.59) (-47.02)
t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, * significant at 1%, * significant at 1%
Country 1 denotes a debtor; country 2 denotes a creditor.
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Table A13: Trade Policy, Regulations and Trade-Related Adjustment
CRS Code Description Clarifications / Additional notes on coverage
33110 Trade policy and adminis-
trative management
Trade policy and planning; support to ministries and departments
responsible for trade policy; trade-related legislation and regula-
tory reforms; policy analysis and implementation of multilateral
trade agreements e.g. technical barriers to trade and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures (TBT/SPS) except at regional level (see
33130); mainstreaming trade in national development strategies
(e.g. poverty reduction strategy papers); wholesale/retail trade;
unspecified trade and trade promotion activities.
33120 Trade facilitation Simplification and harmonisation of international import and ex-
port procedures (e.g. customs valuation, licensing procedures,
transport formalities, payments, insurance); support to customs
departments; tariff reforms.
33130 Regional trade agreements
(RTAs)
Support to regional trade arrangements [e.g. Southern African De-
velopment Community (SADC), Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
African Caribbean Pacific/European Union (ACP/EU)], including
work on technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary
measures (TBT/SPS) at regional level; elaboration of rules of origin
and introduction of special and differential treatment in RTAs.
33140 Multilateral trade negotia-
tions
Support developing countries effective participation in multilateral
trade negotiations, including training of negotiators, assessing im-
pacts of negotiations; accession to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and other multilateral trade-related organisations.
33150 Trade-related adjustment Contributions to the government budget to assist the implemen-
tation of recipients own trade reforms and adjustments to trade
policy measures by other countries; assistance to manage shortfalls
in the balance of payments due to changes in the world trading
environment.
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Figure A13: Aid-for-trade during Sovereign Defaults
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Table A14: Financial Resources as Shares of GDP
Country Bank Corporate Total Country Bank Corporate Total
Loans Bonds Debt Loans Bonds Debt
Albania 0.034 0.000 0.034 Grenada 0.441 0.000 0.441
Algeria 0.416 0.000 0.416 Guatemala 0.142 0.000 0.142
Argentina 0.139 0.010 0.149 Guinea-Bissau 0.033 0.000 0.033
Armenia 0.029 0.000 0.029 Guyana 0.214 0.000 0.214
Aruba 0.407 0.000 0.407 Haiti 0.109 0.000 0.109
Australia 0.502 0.214 0.716 Honduras 0.289 0.000 0.289
Austria 0.841 0.277 1.118 Hong Kong 1.329 0.032 1.361
Azerbaijan 0.031 0.000 0.031 Hungary 0.332 0.000 0.332
Bahamas, The 0.382 0.000 0.382 Iceland 0.400 0.165 0.565
Bahrain 0.386 0.000 0.386 India 0.239 0.008 0.247
Bangladesh 0.164 0.000 0.164 Indonesia 0.340 0.000 0.340
Barbados 0.419 0.000 0.419 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.197 0.000 0.197
Belarus 0.058 0.000 0.058 Ireland 0.451 0.038 0.489
Belgium 0.452 0.528 0.980 Israel 0.520 0.000 0.520
Belize 0.307 0.000 0.307 Italy 0.532 0.283 0.815
Benin 0.101 0.000 0.101 Jamaica 0.229 0.000 0.229
Bhutan 0.008 0.000 0.008 Japan 1.607 0.409 2.016
Bolivia 0.241 0.000 0.241 Jordan 0.584 0.000 0.584
Botswana 0.106 0.000 0.106 Kazakhstan 0.129 0.000 0.129
Brazil 0.280 0.047 0.327 Kenya 0.186 0.000 0.186
Bulgaria 0.532 0.000 0.532 Korea, Rep. 0.465 0.333 0.798
Burkina Faso 0.125 0.000 0.125 Kuwait 0.541 0.000 0.541
Burundi 0.078 0.000 0.078 Lao PDR 0.041 0.000 0.041
Cambodia 0.031 0.000 0.031 Latvia 0.132 0.000 0.132
Cameroon 0.204 0.000 0.204 Lesotho 0.153 0.000 0.153
Canada 0.702 0.175 0.877 Lithuania 0.149 0.000 0.149
Cape Verde 0.067 0.000 0.067 Luxembourg 1.020 0.675 1.695
Central Africa 0.070 0.000 0.070 Macao 0.696 0.000 0.696
Chad 0.097 0.000 0.097 Macedonia, FYR 0.343 0.000 0.343
Note: This table lists credit by bank loans (lending of banks and other financial intermediaries to the
private sector) and corporate bonds (private bond market capitalization), as well as them sum(labeled
total debt in the table), all as shares of GDP. It covers 149 countries, averaged between 1985 and 1995.
The data are from Beck et al. (1999).
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Table A15: Financial Resources as Shares of GDP (Continued)
Country Bank Corporate Total Country Bank Corporate Total
Loans Bonds Debt Loans Bonds Debt
China 0.739 0.028 0.767 Madagascar 0.151 0.000 0.151
Colombia 0.258 0.005 0.263 Malawi 0.091 0.000 0.091
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.003 0.000 0.003 Malaysia 0.892 0.226 1.118
Congo, Rep. 0.119 0.000 0.119 Mali 0.102 0.000 0.102
Costa Rica 0.141 0.000 0.141 Malta 0.708 0.000 0.708
Cote d’Ivoire 0.323 0.000 0.323 Mauritania 0.285 0.000 0.285
Croatia 0.246 0.000 0.246 Mauritius 0.324 0.000 0.324
Cyprus 0.873 0.000 0.873 Mexico 0.181 0.014 0.195
Czech Republic 0.679 0.024 0.703 Moldova 0.038 0.000 0.038
Denmark 0.399 0.963 1.362 Mongolia 0.070 0.000 0.070
Djibouti 0.487 0.000 0.487 Morocco 0.220 0.000 0.220
Dominica 0.404 0.000 0.404 Mozambique 0.073 0.000 0.073
Dominican Republic 0.215 0.000 0.215 Myanmar 0.048 0.000 0.048
Ecuador 0.193 0.000 0.193 Nepal 0.120 0.000 0.120
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.247 0.000 0.247 Netherlands 0.752 0.246 0.998
El Salvador 0.041 0.000 0.041 New Zealand 0.600 0.000 0.600
Equatorial Guinea 0.168 0.000 0.168 Niger 0.133 0.000 0.133
Estonia 0.116 0.000 0.116 Nigeria 0.120 0.000 0.120
Ethiopia 0.037 0.000 0.037 Norway 0.548 0.254 0.802
Fiji 0.317 0.000 0.317 Pakistan 0.239 0.000 0.239
Finland 0.743 0.376 1.119 Panama 0.475 0.000 0.475
France 0.846 0.517 1.363 Papua New Guinea 0.232 0.000 0.232
Gabon 0.146 0.000 0.146 Paraguay 0.174 0.000 0.174
Gambia, The 0.125 0.000 0.125 Peru 0.065 0.009 0.074
Germany 0.941 0.464 1.405 Philippines 0.197 0.000 0.197
Ghana 0.037 0.000 0.037 Poland 0.280 0.000 0.280
Greece 0.335 0.037 0.372 Portugal 0.577 0.079 0.656
Russian Federation 0.076 0.000 0.076 Sweden 0.439 0.529 0.968
Rwanda 0.071 0.000 0.071 Switzerland 1.466 0.542 2.008
Samoa 0.124 0.000 0.124 Syrian Arab Republic 0.068 0.000 0.068
Saudi Arabia 0.190 0.000 0.190 Tanzania 0.041 0.000 0.041
Senegal 0.253 0.000 0.253 Thailand 0.789 0.065 0.854
Seychelles 0.077 0.000 0.077 Togo 0.222 0.000 0.222
Singapore 0.817 0.134 0.951 Tonga 0.285 0.000 0.285
Slovak Republic 0.400 0.000 0.400 Trinidad and Tobago 0.317 0.000 0.317
Slovenia 0.202 0.000 0.202 Tunisia 0.517 0.000 0.517
Solomon Islands 0.155 0.000 0.155 Turkey 0.141 0.005 0.146
South Africa 0.504 0.180 0.684 Uganda 0.023 0.000 0.023
Spain 0.722 0.134 0.856 Ukraine 0.013 0.000 0.013
Sri Lanka 0.157 0.000 0.157 United Kingdom 1.065 0.123 1.188
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.543 0.000 0.543 United States 0.522 0.720 1.242
St. Lucia 0.465 0.000 0.465 Uruguay 0.252 0.000 0.252
St. Vincent & Gren. 0.353 0.000 0.353 Vanuatu 0.362 0.000 0.362
Sudan 0.074 0.000 0.074 Zambia 0.060 0.000 0.060
Suriname 0.305 0.000 0.305 Zimbabwe 0.124 0.000 0.124
Swaziland 0.162 0.000 0.162
Note: This table lists credit by bank loans (lending of banks and other financial intermediaries to the
private sector) and corporate bonds (private bond market capitalization), as well as them sum(labeled
total debt in the table), all as shares of GDP. It covers 149 countries, averaged between 1985 and 1995.
The data are from Beck et al. (1999).
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